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This dissertation consists of three independent chapters in the fields of Contract
Theory and Industrial Organization. The starting point of all three chapters is
the observation that information is often asymmetrically distributed in contractual
relationships. In many instances, one party to a contract knows more than the
contractual partner about relevant parameters of the common environment. This
asymmetry facilitates opportunistic behavior of the more knowledgeable party that
threatens the efficiency of the contractual interaction and can reduce the benefit
of the less knowledgeable party.
Chapters 1 and 2 are concerned with topics in Contract Theory. In these chap-
ters, I study the form of information asymmetry that arises in contractual relation-
ships where the less knowledgeable party can reduce its informational disadvantage
vis-à-vis the contractual partner. In Chapter 1, I analyze the opportunity of the
less knowledgeable party to consult a third party – an expert or supervisor – who
can provide advice. In Chapter 2, the less knowledgeable party can itself engage
in monitoring activities to gather additional information.
In Chapter 3, I explore the effect of information asymmetry within firms on
discriminatory pricing in intermediate good markets. In particular, I study price
discrimination and the associated welfare effects in an intermediate good market
where a monopolistic upstream firms sells an input to downstream firms that vary
in their exposure to the problem of asymmetric information due to different degrees
of vertical integration. This chapter therefore contributes to a classical question in
the literature on Industrial Organization.
Chapter 1 is concerned with contractual relationships where a party seeks ad-
vice from a supervisor but fears collusion between its contractual partner and the
supervisor. In this context, I analyze what kind of information or data the party
that seeks advice wants to give to the supervisor.
As an example of such a situation, one can imagine a city council that consid-
ers the construction of a new airport. Before offering a contract to a construction
company, the city council can consult an expert who can provide additional infor-
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mation about the company’s costs of building the airport. The city council fears
that the expert could collude with the construction company and misrepresent her
information in order to induce the city council to make a generous offer to the con-
struction company. The city council decides what data to give to the expert. For
instance, the city council can control whether the expert can inspect the blueprints
for the planned airport, or whether she receives access to data about the past
performances of the construction company. How should the city council optimally
exert its informational control under the threat of collusion between the expert and
the construction company?
An uninformed party with informational control – such as the city council in the
example – faces a trade-off between information elicitation and collusion prevention.
The more data it makes accessible to the supervisor, the better the advice that the
supervisor could provide. However, a better informed supervisor can also organize
collusion with the informed party more effectively.
As a result of this trade-off, I show that the uninformed party optimally with-
holds data from the supervisor. A partially informed supervisor can provide advice
to the uninformed party. At the same time, there remains an information asymme-
try between the supervisor and the informed party that complicates their efforts
to find a collusive agreement against the uninformed party.
Furthermore, I show that if the uninformed party exerts informational control
optimally, it can authorize the supervisor to contract with the informed party on its
behalf without being harmed by the loss of control. Thus, delegation of contracting
is optimal if informational control is exerted in the best way. Informational control
is therefore a substitute to direct control.
Chapter 2 provides an analysis of dynamic contractual relationships where an
uninformed party can engage in monitoring to gather additional information known
to the contractual partner. I compare monitoring strategies that focus on actions
of the informed party with monitoring strategies that concentrate on information
that the informed party learns during the contractual relationship.
Revisiting the previous example, the analysis of Chapter 2 speaks to a situation
where a city council considers to entrust a private company with the construction of
an airport. The construction company can invest in the quality of the blueprint to
lower its costs. The construction costs are also influenced by the ground conditions
that the construction company only observes after it made the blueprint. The city
council can monitor the investment in the quality of the blueprint or the ground
conditions at a monitoring cost.
First, I show that the uninformed party never wants to monitor both the actions
of the informed party and the new information that the informed party learns
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during the contractual relationship. If the city council observes the quality of
the blueprint, it can shift all risk related to ground conditions to the construction
company. Thus, the city council cannot gain from monitoring the ground conditions
in addition to the quality of the blueprints.
Starting from this observation, I show that monitoring of actions always gives
the uninformed party more control over the informed party than monitoring of new
information. However, the two monitoring strategies turn out to be equivalent,
if the actions taken by the informed party are close to efficient. In this case,
the uninformed party simply chooses the monitoring strategy that leads to lower
monitoring costs.
In Chapter 3, I analyze the welfare effects of price discrimination in intermediate
good markets where a monopolistic upstream firm sells an input to downstream
firms with different degrees of vertical integration. Vertically integrated down-
stream firms produce the final good themselves whereas vertically separated firms
delegate the production of the final good to a subcontractor. The subcontractor
has superior information about its costs to transform the intermediate into a final
good. This information asymmetry results in an agency cost for the vertically sep-
arated downstream firm that is not present for vertically integrated downstream
firms.
I show that – due to this asymmetry – the upstream firm wants to offer down-
stream firms different prices depending on their organizational form. I analyze the
welfare effects of this form of price discrimination. It turns out that price discrim-
ination is beneficial for total welfare under mild conditions on demand and cost
functions.
I compare this result to the welfare effects of price discrimination in a model
where all downstream firms are vertically integrated but have different production
technologies. I show that the welfare gain of price discrimination is always larger
in the model with asymmetric agency costs. Moreover, it turns out that price
discrimination reduces welfare in the model with asymmetric production technolo-
gies under the same condition that ensures price discrimination to be beneficial
for welfare in the model with asymmetric agency costs. Thus, the source of cost
differences determines whether price discrimination in intermediate good markets





This chapter is based on Asseyer (2016a).
1.1 Introduction
Collusion is a central concern in contractual relationships where a supervisor pro-
vides advice to a party that faces a trading partner with superior information. The
manager of a division may overstate the difficulty of a project to the head of the
organization in order to increase the wages of his subordinates. The board of direc-
tors of a public company may tolerate opportunistic behavior of the CEO instead
of defending the interests of shareholders. Corrupted public procurement officers
may pay private suppliers overly high prices to the detriment of the taxpayer.1
In many instances, the party who seeks advice can influence what the supervi-
sor knows about its trading partner. The head of an organization decides whether
to inform a manager about the education of her subordinates. Shareholders choose
the number and expertise of outside directors on their board. A government agency
determines how much data a public procurement officer receives about past per-
formances of private suppliers.
In this chapter, I explore how the uninformed party should exert informational
control under the threat of collusion between the supervisor and the trading part-
ner. Furthermore, I analyze how optimal informational control influences the or-
ganizational form of the contractual relationship.
1Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) provide empirical evidence for collusion between managers
and workers. Hallock (1997) and Fracassi and Tate (2012) document friendly boards and show that
they harm shareholders. Di Tella and Schargrodsky (2003) provide evidence for public procurement
fraud.
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I study a principal-supervisor-agent model where the agent can realize a project
for the principal at a privately known cost, the supervisor observes a signal about
the agent’s costs, and the supervisor is protected by limited liability. I add collusion
between the supervisor and the agent and informational control for the principal
to the model. Following the literature on mechanism design with collusion, the
supervisor and the agent can write an enforceable side-contract that specifies side-
payments and coordinates their behavior under the contract proposed by the prin-
cipal. In the spirit of the literature on Bayesian persuasion, the principal exerts
informational control by freely choosing an information structure that generates
the supervisor’s signal.
I analyze the principal’s optimal combination of an information structure and
a contract. I show that the principal wants to inform the supervisor only partially
about the agent.
The optimal information structure is shaped by a trade-off between information
elicitation and collusion prevention. If the supervisor receives additional informa-
tion about the agent, the informational advantage of the agent over the supervisor
decreases. This is beneficial for the principal as long as the supervisor shares her
information truthfully. However, it also reduces information asymmetry in the
colluding coalition and therefore enables the supervisor and the agent to collude
more efficiently. Due to this trade-off, the principal finds it optimal to withhold
information from the supervisor.
Furthermore, I study the implications of informational control for the organi-
zational form of the contractual relationship. I show that hierarchical delegation
is an optimal organizational form if the principal exerts informational control op-
timally. Under the optimal information structure, the principal can authorize the
supervisor to contract with the agent and achieve the same payoff as under the op-
timal centralized contract. This implies that informational control is a substitute
for direct control.
Under delegation, the principal cannot directly influence the payoff of the agent.
This is possible under centralized contracting and offers the principal an additional
instrument to fight collusion. If the principal increases the agent’s rent in the non-
cooperative equilibrium of the contract, it becomes harder for the supervisor to
find a profitable side-contract as she needs to compensate the agent. However, the
principal needs to finance the rent payments to the agent which may make this
strategy expensive.
I show that there exists an optimal combination of an information structure and
a contract where the agent receives no rent. This implies that the principal does
not make use of the additional instrument under the optimal information structure.
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Thus, the principal does not benefit from direct control over the agent if it exerts
informational control over the supervisor.
These results have two important implications for contractual relationships.
First, even if data are abundant, information asymmetries can persist as long as
the incentives of supervisors cannot be perfectly aligned with the interests of the
party that seeks advice. Second, if technological developments facilitate the use of
informational control, organizations are more likely to become decentralized and
markets are more likely to be intermediated by experts.
In the next section, I discuss the related literature. Section 1.3 provides a
simple example that illustrates the main results. In section 1.4, I introduce the
model. In section 1.5, I characterize and analyze the optimal combination of an
information structure and a contract. Section 1.6 presents a delegation game that
implements the optimal centralized contract under the optimal information struc-
ture. Section 1.7 concludes the chapter.
1.2 Related Literature
This chapter builds on and contributes to two strands of literature. The first
analyzes the implications of collusion under asymmetric information for mechanism
design. The second studies optimal information design in games.
I model collusion as an enforceable side-contract between parties with soft asym-
metric information. This approach is due to Laffont and Martimort (1997).2 In
Laffont and Martimort (2000), the authors study the provision of a public good
under collusion. In a model with two agents, they show that collusion imposes
no loss on the principal if the private information of agents is uncorrelated but
reduces the principal’s payoff if types are correlated. Che and Kim (2006) study
a setup that encompasses the two player-two type models studied by Laffont and
Martimort. They confirm their first result but demonstrate that collusion does also
not harm the principal with correlated types if there are at least three agents with
unlimited liability.3 In the present chapter, the principal is harmed by collusion
due to the limited liability of the supervisor.
More specifically, the present chapter belongs to the literature on collusive su-
pervision with adverse selection.4 Closely related are the works by Faure-Grimaud
2Collusion with verifiable information is studied in the seminal papers by Green and Laffont
(1979) and Tirole (1986). The papers by Crémer (1996), McAfee and McMillan (1992), and
Caillaud and Jehiel (1998) study collusion under asymmetric information in specific mechanisms.
3Che and Kim’s result also requires risk-neutrality.
4Baliga and Sjöström (1998) and Laffont and Martimort (1998) study collusion and the opti-
mality of delegation in a model with two productive agents and moral hazard (Baliga and Sjöström,
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et al. (2003) and Celik (2009). Both papers study collusion in a model with a prin-
cipal, an agent, and a supervisor who has imperfect information about the agent’s
type. Faure-Grimaud et al. (2003) analyze the optimal mechanism and show that
it can be implemented through delegation. They derive this result in a model
where the agent has two types and the supervisor observes a binary signal. In
Celik (2009), the agent has more than two types and the supervisor’s information
is modelled as a partition of the agent’s type space. In contrast to the result of
Faure-Grimaud et al. (2003), Celik demonstrates that delegation is suboptimal. In
the present chapter, the information structure is endogenously chosen by the prin-
cipal. I show that the principal optimally selects an information structure under
which delegation is optimal.
Mookherjee and Tsumagari (2004) study the optimal design of supplier net-
works and consider the possibility of supervision. Mookherjee et al. (2015) analyze
optimal mechanisms in an environment where a supervisor and a producing agent
can collude against a principal. In contrast to this chapter, they study the situ-
ation where the colluding coalition can enter a side-contract before accepting the
mechanism offered by the principal. The supervisor and the agent can therefore
include the participation decision in the side-contract.5
This chapter is also related to the literature on the optimal design of information
and Bayesian persuasion. As in Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011), the principal can
choose an information structure freely from the set of all information structures that
satisfy a Bayesian consistency requirement, and the supervisor can evaluate any
information structure at no cost. Bergemann et al. (2015) analyze the implications
of a seller’s information on a buyer’s valuation for the possible distributions of
profit for the seller and buyer surplus. In the delegated contracting game studied
in section 1.6 of this chapter, the supervisor and the agent are in a similar situation
as the seller and the buyer in Bergemann et al. (2015). However, there is a third
party – the principal – who seeks to extract surplus from the supervisor and the
agent without observing their information.
Bergemann and Pesendorfer (2007) study the joint optimal design of informa-
tion structure and auction format when the seller can disclose information to bid-
ders. As in Bergemann and Pesendorfer (2007), the current chapter analyzes static
disclosure of information which occurs before the agents make their participation
decision.6
1998) or adverse selection (Laffont and Martimort, 1998).
5Further papers that study this form of collusion are Dequiedt (2007), Pavlov (2008), Che and
Kim (2009), and Che et al. (2014).
6 In this respect, the current chapter differs from Eső and Szentes (2007a,b) and Li and Shi
(2015), who consider sequential information disclosure, where agents first decide whether to par-
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Finally, this chapter is connected to Ortner and Chassang (2015) and Ivanov
(2010). Ortner and Chassang (2015) analyze a principal-monitor-agent model and
show that corruption can be fought by introducing asymmetric information in the
colluding coalition through the use of random transfers. In contrast to the present
chapter, it is therefore the terms of the contract and not the type of the agent over
which there is asymmetric information. This implies that the principal does not
face a trade-off between information elicitation and collusion prevention in their
setting.
Ivanov (2010) studies informational control and delegation in the model of
Crawford and Sobel (1982). The uninformed party can design the signal of the
informed party and decides whether to delegate decision making to the informed
party. Ivanov shows that informational control and direct control – the uninformed
party’s decision to keep decision rights – can be substitutes or complements. This
contrasts with the analysis under commitment in the present chapter where infor-
mational control and direct control are shown to be substitutes.
1.3 An illustrative example
In this section, I illustrate the main results of this chapter in a simple example.
The government agency P considers the construction of a new airport. The
construction company A can build the airport for P . P does not know A’s costs to
realize the project. What it knows is that these costs depend on potential problems
that A encounters during construction and on A’s specialization. Suppose for
simplicity that A encounters exactly one of two problems – problem a or b – and
is either specialized in solving one type of the problem or is an all-rounder. If the
encountered problem is A’s speciality, his costs are low. If A encounters one type
of the problem but is specialized in the other, costs are high. If A is an all-rounder,
costs are intermediate independently of the type of the problem. A knows both the
type of the problem and his specialization. From the perspective of P , all types of
the problem and all specializations are equally likely and the type of the problem
is independent from A’s specialization. Figure 1.1 summarizes this description and
specifies numbers for low, intermediate, and high costs.
P ’s gross benefit of the airport is 4. If P bargains directly with A, P ’s optimal
price offer to A is the solution to the following monopsony problem:
max
p
Pr(costs ≤ p)(4− p).
ticipate and then receive information, or from Bergemann and Wambach (2015) where agents
receive new information sequentially.
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Figure 1.1: The determinants of A’s costs
problem a: 1/2 problem b:
1/2
specialist a: 1/3 1 3
specialist b: 1/3 3 1
all-rounder: 1/3 2 2
The table shows A’s costs of realizing the project depending on the type of the problem and A’s
specialization. A encounters either problem a or problem b. Both problems are equally likely to
occur. Each specialization is equally likely. The type of the problem is independent from A’s
specialization.
As low, intermediate, and high costs are all equally likely from P ’s perspective, the
price p = 2 is optimal and gives P an expected payoff of 43 .
Instead of immediately offering a price to A, P can hire a consultant S. S
can evaluate the type of the problem and the specialization of A at no cost. P
can control whether S evaluates the problem or the specialization by granting her
access to the blueprints of the planned airport or to data about past construction
projects of A. However, P relies on truthful reports of S about the results of her
evaluations. S owns assets of value 1 and can never be held liable for more than this
value. S and A value the outside option of not participating in the construction
project by zero.
If P can exclude the possibility of collusion between S and A, it optimally
offers S a fixed fee equal to the value of her outside option and grants her access
to all data about the type of the problem and A’s specialization. Through the
fixed fee, S becomes a disinterested party and shares all her knowledge with P . P
then optimally offers A a price equal to his costs and makes an expected payoff of
4− E[costs] = 2.
If S and A can collude, this contract is prone to manipulation. In exchange for a
side-payment, S could promise A to report to P that costs are high independently of
her information. A would be willing to make any side-payment up to the difference
between his costs and the price that the firm pays. As S knows A’s costs, she
knows the maximal side-payment that A is willing to pay. Thus, S and A can find
an efficient collusive agreement and behave as a single player. This is the case for
any possible contract that P could propose. P is therefore back in the monopsony
problem. It optimally offers a price p = 2 to A and receives an expected payoff of
4
3 .
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If S is completely uninformed about A’s costs, she cannot provide any helpful
advice to P . If S is perfectly informed, she can efficiently organize collusion with
A. This again renders her advice useless to P . These extreme cases illustrate that
P faces a trade-off between information elicitation and collusion prevention. If S
receives additional information about A’s costs, this has two effects. On one hand,
it can improve S’s advice and reduce the informational advantage of A over P . On
the other hand, it facilitates collusion as the information asymmetry within the
colluding coalition is reduced. P needs to balance these two effects when it decides
what data to provide to S.
Can P increase its payoff by informing S only partially about the costs of A?
Suppose P allows S to learn only A’s specialization. If A is an all-rounder, S knows
that the costs are intermediate. If A is specialized, S knows that A has low or high
costs with equal probability.
Furthermore, suppose that P commits to the following contract vis-à-vis S and
A. Initially, S is required to post a bond of 1—the value of her assets. If S reports
to P that A is specialized, P offers a price p = 1 to A. If S reports that A is an
all-rounder, P offers a price p = 2. If A accepts the offered price, S can dissolve
the bond. If A rejects the price, P liquidates the bond. If A accepts the low price
offer of 1, S receives a bonus of 1.
If S shares her knowledge with P , S and A always make an expected profit of
zero under this contract. The price offer to A never exceeds his costs. If A is an
all-rounder, S knows that her bond is never liquidated and that she never receives
the bonus. She therefore receives a payoff of zero. If A is specialized, S has an
expected payoff of
Pr(costs = 1|specialized)× 1 + Pr(costs = 3|specialized)× (−1) = 0.
If A accepts the low price offer, S receives the bonus of 1. If A rejects the offer, S
looses her assets of value 1. As both events are equally likely if A is specialized, S
has an expected profit of zero.
If A is specialized, S has nothing to gain from a collusive agreement under
which she promises A to tell P that he is an all-rounder. If A has low costs, he
would pay a maximal side-payment of 1 for this promise. However, S would loose
her bonus of 1 in this case. If A is an all-rounder, S has also no interest to induce
P to offer a lower price by reporting that A is specialized. A would reject the lower
price and S would always loose her assets.
S does also not benefit from a collusive agreement where A promises to reject a
price offer above his costs, as S would loose her assets in this case. If A promises to
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accept a price below his costs, S needs to use her assets or the bonus to compensate
A for the difference between price and costs.
The contract is therefore not prone to collusion and gives S the right incentives
to report A’s specialization truthfully to P . Under the contract, S and A receive
a total payment of 2 if the airport is completed, and make a payment of 1 to P if
the airport is not build. These payments are independent of S’s report about A’s
specialization. This makes the contract robust against collusion.
Through the contract, P receives an expected payoff of
Pr(costs = 3)× 1 + Pr(costs < 3)× (4− 2) = 5
3
.
This payoff is strictly greater than the expected payoff of 43 that P receives if S is
either uninformed or perfectly informed about the costs of A.7 Thus, it is optimal
for P to withhold information from S.
In the contract described above, P communicates with S and makes a price
offer to A. P can implement this contract through delegation. P could offer S a
delegation contract that requires S to post a bond of 1 and specifies a price of 2 to
be paid to S if the airport is completed. P can liquidate the bond if the airport is
not build.8 If S accepts this delegation contract, she can offer a price to A for the
construction of the airport.
It is optimal for S to offer a price p = 1 if she has observed that A is specialized
and to set a price p = 2 if A is an all-rounder. It is easy to check that S’s expected
profit is zero in both cases. P receives the maximal expected payoff of 53 . Note
that the delegation contract does not require any communication between P and
S. Given that P controls S’s information, it can delegate direct control over A to
S without loosing money.
If S evaluates A’s specialization, her learning process can be represented as an
information structure as depicted in Figure 1.2.
The information structure generates a signal σ1 if the costs of A are either
high or low. It generates a signal σ2 if the costs are intermediate. The signal σ1
leads to the same posterior belief over the costs as if S learns that A is specialized.
The signal σ2 is equivalent to learning that A is an all-rounder. In the analysis of
the general model, informational control is modelled as the possibility to choose
an arbitrary information structure. This reduced-form approach allows to flexibly
7If S evaluates only the type of the problem, P ’s maximal expected payoff is also 4
3
. If the
type of the problem is known, all cost levels of A are equally likely—as in the case where the type
of the problem is unknown. Thus, a price of p = 2 remains optimal independently of the type of
the problem.
8This arrangement corresponds to performance bonds widely used in procurement practice.
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This information structure is equivalent to learning A’s specialization. There are two signals. The
signal σ1 is generated if A’s costs are either 1 or 3. Observing this signal is equivalent to observing
that S is specialized in one type of the problem. The signal σ2 is generated if costs are 2 and is
equivalent to observing that A is an all-rounder.
model any possible learning process of S.
As it will be shown in section 1.5, the information structure depicted above
is the optimal way to inform S among all possible information structures. Under
this information structure, P can avoid to pay rents to A. Importantly, it can also
avoid rent payments to S. This follows from the fact that the information structure
features two signals that have the same value for S. Under the first signal σ1, S
can receive a bonus but may also loose her assets. Under the second signal σ2, S is
certain neither to receive a bonus nor to loose her assets. I show in section 1.5 that
this is a general feature of the optimal information structure. The better the good
state after a certain signal, the higher the risk that the project is not realized in
which case S looses money. The optimal information balances the positive and the
negative content of signals to create signals that are equivalent to S. This allows
P to reduce rent payments to S who can never claim to have received bad news.
1.4 The model
There are three players: the principal P (”it”), the supervisor S (”she”), and the
agent A (”he”). P seeks the realization of a project. It values the completion of
the project by v ∈ R. Only A can realize the project for P . If A realizes the
project, he incurs a cost of θ. A is privately informed about θ which belongs to
the interval Θ = [θ, θ] ⊂ R. The cost θ is the realization of a random variable θ̃
with cumulative distribution function (cdf) F (θ) = Pr(θ̃ ≤ θ). The realization of
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the project is socially beneficial with a positive probability, i.e., Pr(θ̃ < v) > 0.
S can observe and interpret a signal σ at no cost. The signal is the realization
of a random variable σ̃ that may be informative about A’s cost. S is protected
by limited liability, i.e., she can never incur losses that exceed the maximal loss
ℓ ∈ [0,∞). The signal σ is observed by S and A but not by P . P decides the
informativeness of the signal by choosing an information structure.
Information structures
P has informational control and decides how S is informed about A’s cost of project
realization. Following the literature on Bayesian persuasion, I model informational
control as the possibility to freely choose an information structure. An information
structure is given by I = (Σ, µ) where Σ is a set of signals with generic element
σ ∈ Σ and µ ∈ ∆(Σ×Θ) is a probability measure on the set of possible realizations
of A’s cost and S’s signal. µ induces conditional cdfs of θ on σ and a marginal cdf
of σ given by G(θ|σ) = Pr(θ̃ ≤ θ|σ) and H(σ) = Pr(σ̃ ≤ σ). These have to be
consistent with the unconditional distribution F (θ) and satisfy∫
Σ
G(θ|σ)dH(σ) = F (θ).
Let I be the set of all information structures. Given some information structure
I, Supp(µ) ⊂ Σ×Θ denotes the support of the random variable (σ̃, θ̃).
Allocations
An allocation describes whether the project is realized and what transfers are paid
from P to S and A. An allocation is given by (x, tS , tA) ∈ {0, 1} × R2. Project
realization is denoted by x = 1. The transfer from P to i is given by ti with
i ∈ {A,S}. The allocation (x, tS , tA) leads to payoffs of tA − θx for A, tS for S,
and vx− tA − tS for P . S and A value their outside options at zero.
Collusion
Following the literature on collusion in mechanism design, collusion is modelled as
an enforceable side-contract between S and A that coordinates their communica-
tion with P and specifies side-transfers. Thus, P cannot observe any exchange of
transfers or communication between the agents. In contrast, the realization of the
project is observable and contractible. Starting from an allocation (x, tA, tS), S
and A can modify the allocation to (x, tA + τ, tS − τ). Furthermore, S and A can
influence x, tA, and tS through their communication with P . If the signal σ is not
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perfectly informative about the cost θ, the side-contract needs to incentivize A to
report his costs truthfully. I assume that S proposes the side-contract to A in a
take-it-or-leave-it offer.
Contracts and side-contracts
I now describe the contract which P offers to S and A, and the side-contract which
S can offer to A. Without loss of generality, P offers a contract that takes the form
of a direct mechanism
β =
(
x(σ̂S , σ̂A, θ̂), tS(σ̂S , σ̂A, θ̂), tA(σ̂S , σ̂A, θ̂)
)
,
which assigns an allocation to any profile of reports (σ̂S , σ̂A, θ̂) where σ̂i is the
report of i ∈ {S,A} about σ ∈ Σ, and θ̂ is the report from A about θ ∈ Θ.
Similarly, there is no loss of generality in focussing on direct side-contracts






where ρ : Θ× Σ → Σ2 ×Θ is a reporting strategy to the mechanism β, and θ̆ ∈ Θ
is a report from A about the cost θ ∈ Θ. For a signal σ ∈ Σ and a report θ̆ ∈ Θ
from A, the side-contract induces the allocation(
x(ρ(θ̆;σ)), tS(ρ(θ̆;σ))− τ(θ̆;σ), tA(ρ(θ̆;σ)) + τ(θ̆;σ)
)
.
The null side-contract is the side-contract that does not change the allocation and
reports the information about σ and θ truthfully. Thus, the null side-contract
satisfies ρ(θ̆;σ) = (σ, σ, θ̆) and τ(θ̆;σ) = 0 for all σ ∈ Σ and θ̆ ∈ Θ.
Timing and equilibrium concept
The timing of the game is as follows.
t=0: P chooses an information structure I ∈ I and offers a mechanism β to S and
A.
t=1: S and A observe I, β, and the realization of the signal σ. A furthermore
observes θ.
t=2: S and A each accept or reject P ’s offer. If either of them rejects, both agents
receive their outside option. Otherwise the game continues.
t=3: S offers a side-contract γ to A.
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t=4: A accepts or rejects S’s offer. If A accepts, the side-contract and the mech-
anism are executed. If A rejects, both agents play the mechanism non-
cooperatively.
I focus on perfect Bayesian equilibria (PBE) with passive beliefs. In these equilibria,
S does not update her belief about θ if A rejects the side-contract off the equilibrium
path. This approach follows Laffont and Martimort (1997) and the concept of weak
collusion-proofness in Laffont and Martimort (2000).
1.5 Optimal contract with informational control
In this section, I analyze how P optimally designs an information structure and
a contract under the threat of collusion. First, I state P ’s problem formally and
present the benchmarks without supervision and without collusion as natural lower
and upper bounds on P ’s expected profit. I then provide a solution to P ’s problem
and analyze its properties.
P’s problem
P optimally chooses an information structure I and a direct mechanism β in order
to maximize her expected payoff under the constraints that S and A want to
participate in the mechanism, that S never incurs a loss greater than ℓ, that S
and A report their private information truthfully to the mechanism, and that there
does not exist a feasible side-contract which gives S a strictly higher payoff than
to participate non-cooperatively in the mechanism. Thus, I invoke a collusion-
proofness principle: Any payoff that P can achieve in an equilibrium where S and
A collude through a non-trivial side-contract, can also be attained in a collusion-
proof mechanism. This approach follows Laffont and Martimort (1997). A proof of
this statement in the current model can be provided along the lines of Proposition 4



















tS(σ̂S , σ, θ̃)|σ
]
, (ICS)
tA(σ, σ, θ)− θx(σ, σ, θ) ≥ 0, (PCA)
tA(σ, σ, θ)− θx(σ, σ, θ) ≥ tA(σ, σ̂A, θ̂)− θx(σ, σ̂A, θ̂), (ICA)
tS(σ̂S , σ̂A, θ̂) ≥ −ℓ; (LL)
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tA(ρ(θ;σ)) + τ(θ;σ)− θx(ρ(θ;σ)) ≥ tA(σ, σ, θ)− θx(σ, σ, θ), (PCγA)
tA(ρ(θ;σ)) + τ(θ;σ)− θx(ρ(θ;σ)) ≥ tA(ρ(θ̆; s))− τ(θ̆; s)− θx(θ̆; s), (ICγA)
tS(ρ(θ;σ))− τ(θ;σ) ≥ −ℓ; (LLγ)
for all (σ, θ, θ̆) ∈ Σ2 × Θ. A mechanism β is called feasible if it satisfies the
constraints (PCS), (ICS), (PCA), (ICA), and (CP ). A side-contract γ is called
feasible if it satisfies the constraints (PCγA) and (IC
γ
A). If an information structure
I is exogenously fixed, P ’s reduced problem of choosing an optimal contract is
denoted by PI .
Benchmarks
Before I turn to study P ’s problem, it is insightful to examine the following three
benchmark cases.
Complete information If θ is publicly observable, P implements the allocation
(x∗(θ), t∗S(θ), t
∗
A(θ)) where the project is realized whenever P ’s benefit exceeds A’s
cost, S receives no positive payment, and A is exactly compensated for his costs:9
x∗(θ) = 1(θ≤v)(θ), t
∗
S(θ) = 0, and t
∗
A(θ) = θ · 1(θ≤v)(θ).





(v − θ)dF (θ).
No supervision If P and A are the only players and no supervisor is available,
P ’s problem is equivalent to that of a monopsonistic buyer. Thus, P optimally
offers A a price p = θns that is a solution to the maximization problem
max
p∈[θ,θ]
(v − p)F (p).
P can also achieve the monopsony payoff if S is present. For instance, P could
choose an uninformative signal σ and make the mechanism independent of any
report of S. Thus, the monopsony payoff is a lower bound on P ’s expected payoff.
9The indicator function 1A(x) satisfies 1A(x) = 1 if x ∈ A and 1A(x) = 0 if x ̸∈ A.
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No collusion If collusion is not possible, the principal’s problem is equivalent to
problem P without the collusion-proofness constraint (CP ). In this case, P can
achieve an expected payoff equal to the maximal social surplus W . This can be
done by choosing a signal which perfectly reveals θ. If P pays S a constant transfer
of zero independently of her report, S is willing to share her information with P
and the limited liability constraint is satisfied. P can then offer A a price exactly
equal to his costs as long as θ ≤ v. A cannot do better than to accept this offer
and P receives a payoff of max{v − θ, 0}. Its expected payoff is therefore W .
In the remainder of this section, I characterize an optimal combination of an
information structure and a contract. At first, I show that under any collusion-
proof contract, the total sum of transfers to S and A depends only on the project
realization decision. This simplification allows me to derive an upper bound on
P ’s payoff which is independent of the information structure and the contract. I
then present a combination of an information structure and a contract with which
P can reach the upper bound.
Simplifying transfers
I start with an observation which considerably simplifies the structure of transfers
which P pays to S and A in a collusion-proof mechanism.
Lemma 1.1. Let I be an information structure and β be a feasible mechanism. It
holds that
x(σ, σ, θ) = x(σ′, σ′, θ′)
⇒ tS(σ, σ, θ) + tA(σ, σ, θ) = tS(σ′, σ′, θ′) + tA(σ′, σ′, θ′)
for all (σ, θ), (σ′, θ′) ∈ supp(µ).
The lemma implies that for any collusion-proof contract, the total transfer to
S and A depends only on whether the project is realized or not. To see why this is
the case, suppose there is a mechanism for which the two reporting profiles (σ, σ, θ)
and (σ′, σ′, θ′) both lead to the realization of the project but the sum of transfers is
higher after the report (σ′, σ′, θ′). S can then propose a side-contract which reports
(σ′, σ′, θ′) whenever the true types are (σ, σ, θ) and use the transfer τ to make A
indifferent between participation in the side-contract and non-cooperative play of
the mechanism. As the total sum of transfers is higher under the report (σ′, σ′, θ′),
the side-contract is strictly profitable for S. The original contract is therefore not
collusion-proof.
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It follows directly from Lemma 1.1 that for any feasible mechanism β, there
exist two numbers (T, r) ∈ R2 such that the sum of transfers to S and A under β
can be expressed as a function of the project realization decision:
tS(σ, σ, θ) + tA(σ, σ, θ) = T + x(σ, σ, θ)r.
I call (T, r) the collective transfers associated with the mechanism β. As the sum
of transfers to the two agents can only depend on whether the project is realized, it
can at most take two values T0 and T1. T0 is paid if the project is not realized, and
T1 is paid if the project is realized. Thus there exist T and r such that T0 = T and
T1 = T + r. T can be interpreted as a signing fee paid from P to the agents upon
acceptance of the mechanism. r can be interpreted as a bonus that is additionally
paid contingent on project realization. P ’s expected profit from the mechanism β
can therefore be written as
(v − r)E[x(σ̃, σ̃, θ̃)]− T.
Upper bound on P’s payoff
The results from the previous paragraphs can be used to derive an upper bound
on P ’s payoff for all information structures and mechanisms. This upper bound is
based on the social surplus and a lower bound on the joint payoff which A and A
can secure through a side-contract.
Any mechanism β induces some ex-ante probability of project realization. This
probability is given by X = E[x(σ̃, σ̃, θ̃)]. The expected social surplus under this
mechanism cannot be greater than the social surplus under a feasible mechanism
β′ where the same ex-ante probability of project realization X is reached with the
lowest possible set of types. This means that A only realizes the project if his costs
are weakly below the cutoff θc(X) that is defined as
θc(X) ≡ min {θ ∈ Θ : F (θ) ≥ X} .




(v − θ)dF (θ)− (F (θc(X))−X)(v − θc(X))




where the second line follows from integration by parts. Due to the participation
constraints of S and A, W ∗(X) is an upper bound on P ’s expected payoff under
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any mechanism β with an ex-ante probability of production X.
P ’s expected payoff from the mechanism β is given by
X(v − T − r)− (1−X)T.
In the following lemma, I state a result that allows to derive a second upper bound
on P ’s payoff based on this expression.
Lemma 1.2. For any information structure I and any feasible mechanism β with
X = E[x(σ̃, σ̃, θ̃)], the associated collective transfers (T, r) ∈ R2 satisfy i) T ≥ −ℓ,
ii) r ≥ θc(X), and iii) T + r ≥ θc(X).
The limited liability of S implies that she can never pay more than ℓ to P .
When A decides whether to participate, he is informed about the signal σ and
about his costs θ. This implies that A can always avoid negative payoffs by not
participating in the mechanism. Point i) follows from these two observations.
A realizes the project for the cost level θc(X) after some signal σc. S and A
need to receive a bonus of at least θc(X) to compensate A for the production costs.
Otherwise, A either does not want to participate in the mechanism, or S and A
can find a profitable side-contract where A does not produce if the costs are θc(X).
This implies that point ii) needs to be satisfied.
Finally, point iii) is implied by the following argument. If the unconditional
payment T is positive, point ii) implies iii). If it is negative, the total payment
to S and A still needs to exceed the cutoff type θc(X). Otherwise, S would have
a negative expected payoff after the signal σc and would not participate in the
mechanism.
The lemma implies that P ’s expected profit from any mechanism with ex-ante
probability of project realization of X is bounded from above by
W ◦(X) = X(v − θc(X)) + (1−X)ℓ.
This expression reflects that P needs to pay the coalition at least a transfer equal
to the cutoff type, whenever the project is realized. If the project is not realized,
P can extract at most the maximal liability of S.
P ’s expected profit is bounded from above by the social surplus W ∗(X) and
the function W ◦(X). The following proposition states this result formally.
Proposition 1.1. For any information structure I and any feasible mechanism β,
P ’s expected profit UP (I, β) satisfies
UP (I, β) ≤ W (X) ≡ min {W ∗(X),W ◦(X)} with X = E[x(σ̃, σ̃, θ̃)].
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The proposition states that there exists an upper bound W (X) on P ’s expected
profit which depends only on the ex-ante probability of project realization and
is otherwise independent of the mechanism and the information structure. The
minimal upper bound on the functionW (X) for any value of the ex-ante probability
of project realization – given by supX∈[0,1]W (X) – constitutes a global upper bound
on P ’s expected payoff for any information structure I and any feasible mechanism
β.
Proposition 1.1 can be used to show that the partially revealing information
structure and the contract proposed in the illustrative example are optimal. Fig-
ure 1.3 depicts the functions W ∗(X) and W ◦(X) for the illustrative example. The
maximum of the minimum of the two upper bounds is attained for X = 23 where
W (23) =
5
3 . The information structure and the mechanism described in the illus-
trative example give P an expected payoff of 53 and are therefore optimal.













The dashed line is the first upper bound W ∗(X). The solid line is the second upper bound W ◦(X).
The minimum of the two functions W (X) is maximized at X = 2
3
.
The upper bound W (X) has a well defined maximum, i.e., the maximization
problem maxX∈[0,1]W (X) has a solution. In order to characterize the maximizer,
denote the intersection point of W ∗(X) and W ◦(X) by X†. The intersection point




X ∈ [0, 1] : W ◦(X ′) > W ∗(X ′) for X ′ < X, (1.1)
W ◦(X ′) < W ∗(X ′) for X ′ > X
}
.









The following Lemma characterizes the ex-ante probability Xc at which the upper
bound on P ’s profit attains its maximum.
Lemma 1.3. The intersection point X† is uniquely defined by equation (1.1) and
X◦(X) is well defined for all X ∈ [0, 1] by equation (1.2). Moreover, a solution to
the optimization problem maxX∈[0,1]W (X) exists and is given by
Xc =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
X† if X† < F (v) and W ∗(X†) > W ◦(X◦(X†))
X◦(X†) if X† < F (v) and W ∗(X†) ≤ W ◦(X◦(X†))
F (v) if X† ≥ F (v).
The intersection point X† is well defined as the difference between the two
upper bounds W ◦(X)−W ∗(X) is decreasing in the ex-ante probability of project
realization. The constrained maximizer X◦(X) is well defined as W ◦(X) is left-
continuous with downward jumps. This property is inherited from the cutoff type
θc(X) that is increasing, left-continuous, and exhibits upward jumps at some value
X if the cdf F (·) is constant and equal to X over a non-degenerate interval in [0, 1].
As W ∗(X) is continuous and W ◦(X) is left-continuous, the upper bound W (X) is
left-continuous. At the intersection point X†, the upper bound W (X) can exhibit
a discontinuity if the function W ◦(X) makes a downward jump. In this case, it
holds that
W ◦(X†) ≥ W ∗(X†) > lim
X↘X†
W ◦(X).
The discontinuity must be a downward jump. Thus, W (X) is left-continuous with
only downward jumps and therefore has a well defined maximizer—given by Xc.
It follows that W (Xc) is a global upper bound on P ’s expected payoff.
10As the functions W ∗(X) and W ◦(X) may not necessarily intersect, the intersection point may
also describe the point where one function jumps above the other.
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P can reach the upper bound
In the following, a solution to P ’s problem is presented. I construct a combination
of an information structure and a mechanism with which P can implement any ex-
ante probability of project realization X and achieve an expected payoff equal to
the upper bound W (X). Suppose for now that the cdf F (·) has a strictly positive
density f(·). This assumption is made to clarify the exposition. All proofs in the
appendix apply to the case where F (θ) may exhibit mass points. The construction
presented in this section proves the following statement.
Proposition 1.2. For any X ∈ [0, 1] there exists an information structure I and
a mechanism β such that E[x(σ̃, σ̃, θ̃)] = X and UP (I, β) = W (X).
The key idea behind the construction of the optimal combination of an infor-
mation structure and a contract is to avoid rent payments to A without creating
the possibility for S to earn high rents through collusion.
Consider an information structure as depicted in Figure 1.4. This information
structure has a signal space equal to the lowest cost values of A such that the project
is realized with ex-ante probability X, i.e. Σ = [θ, θc(X)]. If A’s costs θ lie below
the cutoff θc(X), the signal σ = θ is drawn. The remaining mass of non-producing
types is distributed over all signals in Σ. In particular, no type in [θc(X), θ] is
more likely to generate a certain signal than any other type. The distribution of
these types can therefore be described by a weighting function α : Σ → R+ which
is positive and satisfies
∫
Σ α(σ)dσ = 1.










A weighted information structure has as many signals as types below the cutoff θc(X). If costs
take the value θ below the cutoff, then the signal θ is generated. If costs take a value above the
cutoff, a signal is generated according to the density α(·) that depends only on the signal and not
on the costs.
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0 if θ < σ
f(σ)







1−F (θc(X)) if θ > θ
c(X)





I denote an information structure with a characterizing weighting function of α(·)
by Iα and refer to it as a weighted information structure
Such an information structure can be combined with a mechanism that induces
project realization whenever S and A make the same report about the signal and
this report coincides with A’s report about his type:
x(σ̂S , σ̂A, θ̂) = 1(σ̂S=σ̂A=θ̂≤θc(X))(σ̂S , σ̂A, θ̂). (1.3)
The project is therefore realized whenever S and A both report the same signal
and A reports to have the lowest possible cost level possible under the signal.
Furthermore, the mechanism specifies a transfer to A that just compensates him
for his costs in the case that he has the lowest possible cost level:
tA(σ̂S , σ̂A, θ̂) = θ̂x(σ̂S , σ̂A, θ̂). (1.4)
As the mechanism is required to be feasible, by Lemma 1.1, the transfer to S can
be written as
tS(σ̂S , σ̂A, θ̂) = T + x(σ̂S , σ̂A, θ̂)(r − θ̂)
for the collective transfers (T, r).
Vis-à-vis A, the mechanism is equivalent to a price offer equal to the signal.
Therefore, the mechanism satisfies A’s participation constraint (PCA) and his in-
centive compatibility constraint (ICA). Under this mechanism, A never receives a
rent.
On the equilibrium path after the signal σ, S receives an expected payoff of
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From Lemma 1.2 it is known that r ≥ θc(X). Thus, S has nothing to gain from mis-
reporting the signal, as this would reduce her expected payoff to T . Her incentive
compatibility constraint (ICS) is therefore satisfied.
S’s participation constraint (PCS) is satisfied if S has a positive expected payoff
after all signal realizations. P wants to set the fix payment T as low as possible.
Thus, S’s participation constraint has to be binding after the signal for which the








For a given variable payment r, P wants to choose the weighting function α(·)
which maximizes S’s minimal expected gain from project realization over all signals.
Thus, P would like to choose α(·) such that S’s expected gain from trade is constant
across all signal realizations and extract the expected gain through the fix payment
T . If this is possible, P can avoid rent payments to S.
A form of the weighting function which leaves S’s expected payoff US(σ) con-











This weighting function gives S an expected gain of US(σ) = T + C for a given
positive constant C ∈ R+.
If there exists a constant C ≤ ℓ such that the weighting function α is well
defined, then P can extract the whole expected social surplus for a given ex-ante
probability of project realization of X without violating S’s limited liability con-
straint (LL). This turns out to be possible for any ex-ante probability X where
the function W ∗(X) is the stricter upper bound on P ’s profit.
Lemma 1.4. Consider the weighted information structure Iα and the mechanism











If W ∗(X) ≤ W ◦(X), Iα is well defined, β is feasible, and UP (Iα, β) = W (X).
If the upper bound W ◦(X) is more restrictive, P can still find a constant C
such that the weighting function α(·) is a well defined. However, the constant has
to be greater than the maximal loss ℓ. This is not feasible and implies that P
has to leave an information rent to S. It turns out that it is optimal for P to set
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the weight of all signals between some value θ̌(X) and θc(X) to α(·) = 0 and to
choose for the remaining signals in [θ, θ̌(X)] a weighting function which makes the
expected payoff of S for these signals constant:
Lemma 1.5. Consider the weighted information structure Iα and the mechanism
β that are defined by the equations (1.3), (1.4), and





where θ̌(X) ∈ [θ, θc(X)] is uniquely defined by the equation
∫ θ̌(X)
θ
F (σ)dσ = (1−X)(r − θ̌(X)).
If W ◦(X) ≤ W ∗(X), Iα is well defined, β is feasible, and UP (Iα, β) = W (X).
Under the information structures and the mechanisms defined in the two lem-
mata above, S cannot find a strictly profitable collusive agreement with A, i.e.,
the collusion-proofness constraint (CP ) is satisfied. First, note that S has nothing
to gain from a side-contract where the project is not realized even if A’s costs lie
below the cutoff θc(X). In this case, the colluding coalition looses a payoff of r−σ.
Second, S does not gain from a side-contract where S and A misreport the signal
and induce project realization if A’s costs equal the true signal. In this case, the
total expected payment to the coalition is the same with and without collusion and
the probability of project realization does not change either. Finally, note that
the collective transfers in both Lemmata satisfy that the total payment equals the
cutoff type if the project is realized, i.e., T + r = θc(X). This implies that it is
not profitable for the colluding coalition to extend project realization to cost levels
above the cutoff θc(X) where S and A would jointly incur a loss.
Rents and distortions
It is optimal for P to implement the ex-ante probability of project realization Xc
for which it achieves an expected payoff of maxX∈[0,1]W (X). Rent payments to S
and A and potential distortions of the project realization decision depend on which
of the two upper bounds W ∗(X) and W ◦(X) is more restrictive at the optimal
ex-ante probability of project realization Xc.
Proposition 1.3. If W ∗(Xc) ≤ W ◦(Xc), P ’s problem is solved by the information
structure and the mechanism defined in Lemma 1.4 for X = Xc. Neither S nor A
receives a rent. If W ◦(Xc) ≤ W ∗(Xc), P ’s problem is solved by the information
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structure and the mechanism defined in Lemma 1.5 for X = Xc. P leaves a rent
to S and A.
The project realization decision is inefficient if the maximal loss ℓ lies strictly
below the value ℓ that is given by
ℓ ≡
⎧⎨⎩ W1−F (v) if v < θ,∞ if v ≥ θ.
If the upper bound W (X) equals the social surplus at the maximizer Xc, P
can extract the social surplus and neither S nor A receives a positive rent. If
the upper bound W (X) equals the second upper bound W ◦(X) at the maximizer
Xc, P cannot extract the complete social surplus. In the solution to P ’s problem
presented in Lemma 1.5, S receives the remaining surplus as a rent. However, this
solution is not unique. There exist other optimal combinations of an information
structure and a contract for which the remaining surplus is split between S and A.
The project realization decision is distorted if P implements an ex-ante proba-
bility of project realization that is smaller than the efficient probability F (v). This
is the case unless the supervisor’s maximal loss ℓ exceeds the expected maximal
social surplus from project realization by a factor of 11−F (v) . If the project has a
large value to P , the distortion is most likely to arise. Indeed, if P ’s value v exceeds
the highest possible cost of A, then P can never extract the maximal social surplus.
Comparative statics
In this section, I analyze the influence of the maximal loss ℓ on rents, distortions,
and the informedness of S. I assume that the cdf F (θ) is strictly increasing and
differentiable on Θ with a decreasing inverse hazard rate F (θ)/f(θ). This relatively
mild assumption allows to derive clear results on the effect of the maximal loss ℓ on
rents, the probability of project realization, and the signal space under the optimal
information structure. For a given maximal loss ℓ, let θc(ℓ) denote the optimal
cutoff value for project realization, the signal space under the optimal information
structure Iα is denoted by Σ(ℓ). I say that Σ(ℓ) increases (decreases) in ℓ, if
Σ(ℓ′) ⊂ Σ(ℓ′′) for ℓ′ < ℓ′′ (ℓ′ > ℓ′′).
Proposition 1.4. Suppose F (θ) has a strictly positive density f(θ) and F (θ)/f(θ)
is increasing. There exists a value of the maximal liability ℓ with ℓ < ℓ such that
• for ℓ ∈ [0, ℓ], the probability of project realization, total rent payments to S
and A, and the signal space Σ(ℓ) are decreasing.
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The cutoff for project realization depending on the maximal liability ℓ is θc(ℓ) = F−1(Xc(ℓ)). For
ℓ = 0, it equals the monopsony cutoff. For ℓ < ℓ, the cutoff is decreasing, P has to pay rents. For
ℓ > ℓ, neither S nor A receives a rent. For ℓ ∈ (ℓ, ℓ), the cutoff is increasing. For ℓ ≥ ℓ, the cutoff
is efficient. If there are certain gains from trade, i.e. θ ≤ v, efficiency is never attained as ℓ = ∞.
• for ℓ ∈ (ℓ, ℓ), the probability of project realization and the signal space Σ(ℓ)
are increasing. Neither S nor A receives a rent.
• for ℓ ≥ ℓ, the project realization decision is efficient, the signal space Σ(ℓ) is
constant, and neither S nor A receives a rent.
The probability of project realization is not monotone in the maximal loss ℓ.
Figure 1.5 depicts how the cutoff value of project realization changes with the
maximal loss ℓ. For low levels of ℓ, an increase in the maximal loss reduces the
probability with which the project is realized. For high levels of ℓ, the probability
of project realization increases with ℓ.
For low levels of ℓ, P uses an increase in ℓ to reduce rent payments to S.
This is optimally done by deleting the worst signals and extracting a higher fixed
payment (equal to ℓ) from better signal realizations. If ℓ reaches ℓ, P can avoid
rent payments to S. Any increase of ℓ above ℓ is therefore used by P to increase
the probability of project realization and to extract the additional social surplus.
The comparative statics with respect to the information structure shows that S
does not necessarily become better informed if she can incur a higher loss. For low
levels of ℓ, her informedness can decline as ℓ increases. Under the optimal weighted
information structure Iα, the signal space is given by Σ(ℓ) = [θ, θ
c(ℓ)]. The size of
Σ(ℓ) therefore changes one-to-one with θc(ℓ). The signal space is therefore smallest
for ℓ = ℓ.
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The size of the signal space is a rough measure of the informativeness of an
optimal information structure. In order to state whether S is better informed for
a maximal loss ℓ compared with a maximal loss ℓ′, the two optimal information
structures should be ranked in the sense of a Blackwell ordering. An information
structure I is more informative in the sense of Blackwell than another information
structure I ′, if the posterior beliefs that are reached through the different signal
realization of I ′ can be replicated by sending S a garbling of the signals of I.
It turns out that it is generally not possible to order the optimal information
structures in the sense of Blackwell. Nevertheless, for the special case of a uniform
distribution of θ̃, Proposition 1.7 in the appendix shows that for low levels of ℓ, S’s
signal becomes less informative as ℓ increases.
1.6 Delegation
Under the optimal information structure, P can implement the optimal centralized
mechanism through hierarchical delegation whereby P contracts with S who in
turn contracts with A. Consider the following delegation game δ.
t=0: P chooses an information structure I ∈ I and offers a delegation contract
(T, r) to S, where T is a transfer that is paid upon acceptance, and r is paid
if the project is realized.
t=1: S and A observe I, (T, r), and σ, A observes θ.
t=2: S accepts or rejects the delegation contract. If S rejects, the game ends and
the project is not realized.
t=3: If S accepts, she offers a price p to A.
t=4: A accepts the offer and realizes the project or rejects it and the project is not
realized.
In the delegation game, P offers S a delegation contract which pays T conditional
on acceptance and r if the project is realized. S offers A a price p for project
realization. The reduced delegation game where the information structure I is
exogenously fixed is denoted by δI .
If P chooses an optimal information structure, it can implement the optimal
centralized mechanism in the delegation game.
Proposition 1.5. There exists a PBE of the delegation game δ where P sets
the optimal weighted information structure and a delegation contract equal to the
optimal collective transfers, the project is realized with ex-ante probability Xc, and
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P attains the expected payoff W (Xc). Following these choices of P at t = 0, the
continuation equilibrium starting at t = 1 is unique.
Given an optimal information structure, P can delegate the interaction with
A to S without a reduction of its payoff. Thus, informational control substitutes
direct control. The proposition is an implication of the following Lemma.
Lemma 1.6. For any information structure I, the solution to P ’s reduced problem
PI can be implemented in the reduced delegation game δI if A receives no rent on
the equilibrium path, i.e. tA(σ, σ, θ)− θx(σ, σ, θ) = 0.
If P delegates contracting with A to S, then it foregoes one instrument which
is present under the centralized mechanism. This instrument consists in providing
rents to A. These rents make it harder for S to find a side-contract that is ac-
ceptable to A. In particular, P can relax the collusion-proofness constraint (CP )
by tightening A’s participation constraint in the side mechanism (PCγA). However,
this comes at the cost of providing rents to A. In other words, P may channel
additional rents to A in order to make it expensive for S to bribe A into joining
the colluding coalition.
If P can jointly choose the information structure and the mechanism, P does
not make use of this instrument: Under the optimal combination of an information
structure and a mechanism identified in Lemmata 1.4 and 1.5, A never receives
a rent. P does not find it optimal to make it more expansive to bribe A. It
follows that P is as well off under delegated contracting as under the centralized
mechanism.
Delegation can be suboptimal for suboptimal information structures
Delegation is not optimal for any information structure. I show this by revisiting the
illustrative example. Suppose S’s signal is generated by the information structure
depicted in Figure 1.6. This information structure consists of two signals σ1 and
σ2, where σ1 is always send for θ = 1, σ3 is always send for θ = 3, and both signals
are send with equal probability for θ = 2.
Given this information structure, P strictly prefers the optimal centralized
mechanism over delegation. P even prefers to ignore S and to contract directly
with A over delegating to S the task to contract with A.
Proposition 1.6. Suppose that θ is uniformly drawn from Θ = {1, 2, 3}, v = 4,
and ℓ ≥ 0. Given the information structure depicted in Figure 1.6, delegation is
strictly suboptimal.
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Information structure with suboptimal delegation consists of two signals. If costs are low, the
signal σ1 is generated. If costs are high, the signal σ2 is generated. If costs intermediate, each
signal is generated with equal probability.
The information structure in Figure 1.6 features one good and one bad signal.
The presence of the bad signal harms P as it needs to ensure S’s participation
after the bad signal. For instance, consider the case where P sets a delegation
contract under which the project is always realized. This implies that P receives
an expected payment of −T + 4 − r. After the signal σ2, S offers A a price of 3.
The expected payoff of S after this signal is therefore T + r−3. S only accepts the
delegation contract after the signal σ2 if T + r ≥ 3 which implies that P ’s expected
payoff cannot exceed 1. As I show in the proof of this proposition, P can never
earn a higher profit than 1 for any delegation contract (T, r). In contrast, P can
earn an expected payoff of 43 if it directly offers a price to A. Delegation is therefore
strictly suboptimal under the suboptimal information structure depicted in Figure
1.6.
1.7 Concluding remarks
In this chapter, I analyze the optimal use of informational control in a principal-
supervisor-agent model under the threat of collusion between the supervisor and
the agent.
The principal’s optimal information structure is shaped by a trade-off between
information elicitation and collusion prevention. If the supervisor learns additional
information about the agent, the principal can potentially receive better informed
advice from the supervisor. However, the supervisor can use the additional infor-
mation to organize collusion with the agent more effectively. As a consequence,
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the principal optimally provides only partial information about the agent to the
supplier.
Under the optimal information structure, the principal can delegate the inter-
action with the agent to the supervisor and still receive the same payoff as in the
optimal centralized mechanism. Hierarchical delegation is therefore optimal and
informational control substitutes direct control.
These results have implications for the informational design in settings where
a principal can interact with a group of agents only via intermediaries. For the
situation where the principal faces a single intermediary and a single agent, the
results of this chapter provide the optimal way to inform the intermediary. This is
an implication of the fact that any form of delegation – a situation where the prin-
cipal chooses an allocation only depending on communication with the supervisor
who can in turn communicate with the agent – is a collusion-proof mechanism of
the centralized game under collusion. The analysis of intermediated contractual
relationships with several intermediaries and agents has interesting implications for
the study of complex organizations and intermediated markets and is left for future
research.
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1.8 Appendix to Chapter 1
Proof of Lemma 1.1
Toward a contradiction, suppose there exists a mechanism β which satisfies all
constraints. Moreover there exist (σ′, θ′), (σ′′, θ′′) ∈ supp(µ) such that x(σ′, σ′, θ′) =
x(σ′′, σ′′, θ′′) and tS(σ
′, σ′, θ′) + tA(σ
′, σ′, θ′) < tS(σ
′′, σ′′, θ′′) + tA(σ
′′, σ′′, θ′′).
Consider now the side-contract γ = (τ, ρ) which is defined as τ(θ; s) = 0 for
(σ, θ) ̸= (σ′, θ′), τ(θ′;σ′) = tA(σ′′, σ′′, θ′′) − tA(σ′, σ′, θ′), ρ(θ;σ) = (σ, σ, θ) for
(σ, θ) ̸= (σ′, θ′), and ρ(θ′;σ′) = (σ′′, σ′′, θ′′) . This side-contract is feasible by con-
struction, because (PCA) implies (PC
γ








= µ(θ ̸= θ′|σ′)E
[
tS(σ





′′, σ′′, θ′′) + tA(σ
′′, σ′′, θ′′)− tA(σ′, σ′, θ′)
)
> µ(θ ̸= θ′|σ′)E
[
tS(σ
′, σ′, θ)|σ′, θ ̸= θ′
]







Thus, (CP ) is not satisfied for σ′ ∈ Σ, which gives a contradiction.
Proof of Lemma 1.2
T ≥ −ℓ follows from the argument presented in the first paragraph after the lemma.
It remains to show that r ≥ θc(X) and T + r ≥ θc(X).
Let σc be the signal after which the type θc(X) realizes the project. If X = 1,
the expected payoff of S after the signal σc cannot be higher than T + r − θc(1).
Thus, S’s participation constraint is only satisfied after the signal σc if T+r ≥ θc(1).
Suppose now that X < 1. Thus, there exist (σ0, θ0) ∈ Σ × Θ such that
x(σ0, σ0, θ0) = 0. I first show that r ≥ θc(X). Toward a contradiction suppose
that r < θc(X). Consider now the side-contract γ which is defined as
ρ(θ̂;σ) =
⎧⎨⎩(σ0, σ0, θ0) if (σ, θ̂) ∈ {σc} × (r, θc(X)],(σ, σ, θ̂) otherwise, and
τ(θ̂;σ) =
⎧⎨⎩tA(σc, σc, θ̂)− tA(σ0, σ0, θ0) if (σ, θ̂) ∈ {σc} × (r, θc(X)],0 otherwise.
This side-contract gives A always the same payoff than playing the mechanism
non-cooperatively. It follows that the side-contract is feasible. S receives under the
side-contract the same payoff as under the mechanism if (σ, θ) ̸∈ {σ̂} × (r, θc(X)].
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If (σ, θ) ∈ {σ̂} × (r, θc(X)], S’s payoff under the side-contract exceeds her payoff
from the mechanism by θ − r > 0. Thus the mechanism β is not collusion-proof
and it follows that r ≥ θc(X).
S’s expected payoff after the signal σc can be written as
E[x(σc, σc, θ̃)|σc](T + r) + (1− E[x(σc, σc, θ̃)|σc])T − E[tA(σc, σc, θ̃)|σc]
≤ E[x(σc, σc, θ̃)|σc](T + r − θc(X)) + (1− E[x(σc, σc, θ̃)|σc])T
where the second line follows from the fact that (PCA) implies
E[tA(σc, σc, θ̃)|σc] ≥ E[x(σc, σc, θ̃)|σc])θc(X).
It follows from (PCS) that
E[x(σc, σc, θ̃)|σ̂](T + r − θc(X)) + (1− E[x(σc, σc, θ̃)|σc])T ≥ 0.
If T ≥ 0, this is satisfied and T + r ≥ θc(X). If T < 0, this can only be satisfied if
T + r ≥ θc(X).
Proof of Proposition 1.1
The proof follows from the arguments in the main text.
Proof of Lemma 1.3
Note that W ◦(X)−W ∗(X) = (1−X)ℓ−
∫ θc(X)
θ F (θ)dθ is strictly decreasing in X.
Thus, X† is uniquely defined.
Next, observe that θc(X) is an increasing and left-continuous function in X.
This implies thatW ◦(X) is also left-continuous and makes a downward jump at any
point where W ◦(X) is discontinuous, i.e. limX′↗X W
◦(X ′) ≥ limX′↘X W ◦(X ′) for
any X ∈ [0, 1]. Thus maxX′∈[X,1]W ◦(X ′) has a solution for any X ∈ [0, 1] and
X◦(X) is well defined.
As, W ∗(X) is a continuous function, it follows that W (X) is a continuous
function for X < X† and a left-continuous function which exhibits only downward
jumps for X > X†. At X = X†, either W ∗(X†) ≥ W ◦(X†) by continuity of
W ∗(X) and left-continuity of W ◦(X). Thus, W (X) is also left-continuous with
only downward jumps. From this it follows that the solution to maxX∈[0,1]W (X)
is well defined.
IfX† ≥ F (v), then for allX ∈ [0, 1], W (X) ≤ W ∗(X) ≤ W ∗(F (v)) = W (F (v)).
Thus, W (X) is maximized forX = F (v) in this case. Suppose now thatX† < F (v).
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Note that W (X) = W ∗(X) for X ≤ X† and therefore X† = argmaxX∈[0,X†]W (X).
X◦(X†) maximizes W ◦(X) on [X†, 1]. If W ∗(X†) > W ◦(X◦(X†)), then W (X) is
maximized for X = X†. If W ∗(X†) ≤ W ◦(X◦(X†)), then W (X) is maximized for
X = X◦(X†). Thus, Xc as defined in the Lemma maximizes W (X).
Proof of Lemma 1.4
To accommodate the possibility of mass points, I define






F ′(θ) if F ′(θ) exists;
∆F (θ) if ∆F (θ) > 0;
0 otherwise.
(1.6)
I denote the set of mass points by ΘD ≡ {θ ∈ Θ : ∆F (θ) > 0}. As F (·) is a cdf,
there can be at most countably many points θ where F (·) is not differentiable.
It needs to be checked whether Iα is a well defined information structure,
whether β is a feasible mechanism, and whether P achieves an expected payoff
of W (X). This is the case if i) α(·) is a well defined weighting function, ii) the
constraints (LL), (PCS), (PCA), (ICS) and, (ICA) hold, iii) S and A cannot profit
from a joint misrepresentation of the signal σ, and iv) UP (I, β) = W (X).













where the second equality follows from integration by parts. Condition i) is thus
satisfied and Iα is a well defined information structure.










F (θ)dθ = W ◦(X)−W ∗(X) ≥ 0.
Note that under the proposed mechanism, A faces a posted price that equals σ in
equilibrium. Thus, (PCA) and (ICA) are satisfied. (ICS) is also satisfied, because
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a unilateral misreport from S results in a payoff of T < 0. It remains to check
whether (PCS) is satisfied and this is indeed the case as




= T + r − θc(X) = 0,
where the third equality follows from the definition of α(·) and the last equality
follows from the definition of r. Thus, condition ii) is satisfied.
Next, it is shown that S cannot find a feasible and profitable side-contract.
Under any such side-contract, S essentially needs to make a take-it-or-leave-it offer
to A. As the support of any signal σ = θ is {θ} ∪ (θc(X), θ], a deviation implies
that S offers a price θ′ ≥ θc(X). S’s payoff under such a deviation takes the form
T + q(r − θ) where q ∈ [0, 1] is the probability of project realization under the
deviation. Note that
T + q(r − θ) ≤ T + q(r − θc(X)) = (1− q)T ≤ 0.
Thus, S cannot find a profitable and feasible side-contract and condition iii) is
satisfied.
Finally, condition iv) follows from the following calculation:
UP (I, β) = X(v − r)− T
= X(v − r − T )− (1−X)T






Proof of Lemma 1.5
Consider f(·) as defined in the equations (1.5) and (1.6). It needs to be checked
whether Iα is a well defined information structure, whether β is a feasible mecha-
nism, and whether P achieves an expected payoff of W (X). This is the case if i)
α(·) is a well defined weighting function, ii) the constraints (LL), (PCS), (PCA),
(ICS) and, (ICA) hold, iii) S and A cannot profit from a joint misrepresentation
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of the signal σ, and iv) UP (I, β) = W (X).













where the second equality follows from integration by parts and the third equality
follows from the definition of θ̌, Condition i) is thus satisfied and Iα is a well defined
information structure.
I now show that β is a feasible mechanism. β satisfies the limited liability
constraint (LL) as T = −ℓ.
Under the mechanism β, A faces a posted price that equals σ in equilibrium.
Thus, (PCA) and (ICA) are satisfied. (ICS) is also satisfied, because a unilateral
misreport from S results in a payoff of T = −ℓ ≤ 0. It remains to check whether
(PCS) is satisfied. For σ ∈ [θ̌(X), θc(X)], the expected payoff of S after the signal
σ is given by
US(σ) = T + Pr(θ = σ|σ)(r − σ)
= T + r − σ
= −ℓ+ r − σ
= θc(X)− σ ≥ 0.
For σ ∈ [θ, θ̌(X)) S’s expected payoff is given by




= T + r − θ̌(X)
= θc(X)− θ̌(X) ≥ 0.
where the third equality follows from the definition of α(·) and the last equality
follows from the definition of r. Thus, condition ii) is satisfied.
Next, it is shown that S cannot find a feasible and profitable side-contract.
Under any such side-contract, S essentially needs to make a take-it-or-leave-it price
offer to A. As the support of any signal σ = θ is {θ}∪(θc(X), θ], a deviation implies
that S offers a price θ′ ≥ θc(X). S’s payoff under such a deviation takes the form
T+q(r−θ) where q ∈ [0, 1] is the probability of project realization of the deviation.
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Note that
T + q(r − θ) ≤ T + q(r − θc(X)) = (1− q)T ≤ 0.
Thus, S cannot find a profitable and feasible side-contract and condition iii) is
satisfied.
Finally, condition iv) follows from the following calculation:
UP (I, β) = X(v − r)− T
= X(v − r − T )− (1−X)T
= X(v − θc(X)) + (1−X)ℓ
= W ◦(X)
= W (X).
Proof of Proposition 1.3
The only point which remains to be proven is that production is inefficient as long
as ℓ < W
∗(F (v))
1−F (V ) . From the definition of X
c, it is known that θc(X) < F (v) unless
X† ≥ F (v). This is the case if and only if
W ∗(F (v)) ≤ W ◦(F (v)) ⇔ W ∗(F (v)) ≤ (1− F (v))ℓ ⇔ ℓ ≥ W
1− F (v)
.
Proof of Proposition 1.4
In the proposition, the following assumption is stated.
Assumption 1.1. F (θ) has a strictly positive density f(θ) and F (θ)/f(θ) is in-
creasing.
I prove the result along the following sequence of Lemmata.
Lemma 1.7. Under Assumption 1.1, W ∗(X) and W ◦(X) are both differentiable
and strictly quasi-concave.
Proof. Under the assumption, the inverse of the cdf F−1(X) exists and is differen-
tiable. This implies that θc(X) = F−1(X). W ∗(X) and W ◦(X) can therefore be
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written as




W ◦(X) = X(v − F−1(X)) + (1−X)ℓ.
As F−1(X) is differentiable, both functions are differentiable.
I show now that both functions are strictly quasi-concave if F (θ)/f(θ) is in-
creasing. The first derivatives of both functions are given by
dW ∗(X)
dX
= v − F−1(X) and
dW ◦(X)
dX
= v − F−1(X)−X(F−1)′(X)− ℓ.
These first derivatives are both strictly decreasing and change their sign at most
once from + to −. This is obvious for dW
∗(X)
dX as F
−1(X) is strictly increasing. For
dW ◦(X)
dX , this follows from the assumption that F (θ)/f(θ) is increasing: Define the
strictly increasing function φ(θ) ≡ θ+F (θ/f(θ). As F−1(X) is strictly increasing,
it follows that φ(F−1(X)) is strictly increasing. As
φ(F−1(X)) = F−1(X) +X/f(F−1(X)) = F−1(X) +X(F−1)′(X),
F−1(X)+X(F−1)′(X) is strictly increasing. Thus, W ∗(X) and W ◦(X) are strictly
quasi-concave.




X◦(ℓ) if X†(ℓ) ≤ X◦(ℓ);
X†(ℓ) if X†(ℓ) ∈ (X◦(ℓ), F (v));
F (v) if X†(ℓ) ≥ F (v).
Proof. The intersection point of W ∗(X) and W ◦(X) depends on ℓ and is denoted
by X†(ℓ). The maximizer of W ◦(X) also depends on ℓ and is denoted by X◦(ℓ).
Xc(ℓ) is specified in its general form in Lemma 1.3. Here, it simplifies to the
expression above due to the following three observations:
First, recall the definition of X◦(X) and note that due to the strict quasi-
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concavity of W ◦(X), it holds that
X◦(X) =
⎧⎨⎩X◦(ℓ) if X ≤ X◦(ℓ),X if X > X◦(ℓ).
Second, the continuity of W ∗(X) and W ◦(X) implies that the intersection point
X†(ℓ) satisfies W ∗(X†(ℓ)) = W ◦(X†(ℓ)). Finally, for all ℓ ≥ 0, it holds that
X◦(ℓ) < F (v). This follows from the fact that
dW ◦(F (v))
dX
= v − F−1(F (v))− F (v)(F−1)′(F (v))− ℓ < 0.
Lemma 1.9. Under Assumption 1.1, X◦(ℓ) is decreasing in ℓ, X†(ℓ) is increasing
in ℓ, and X◦(ℓ) = X†(ℓ) for some ℓ ∈ (0, ℓ).
Proof. X◦(ℓ) is implicitly defined by the first order condition
dW ◦(X◦(ℓ))
dX
= v − F−1(X◦(ℓ))−X◦(ℓ)(F−1)′(X◦(ℓ))− ℓ = 0.






X†(ℓ) is implicitly defined by
W ◦(X†(ℓ))−W ∗(X†(ℓ)) = (1−X†(ℓ))ℓ−
∫ F−1(X†(ℓ))
θ
F (θ)dθ = 0







Note that X◦(0) = F (θns) > 0 and X†(0) = 0. Thus, there exists some ℓ ∈ (0,∞)
such that X◦(ℓ) = X†(ℓ). If v < θ, X◦(ℓ) < F (v) furthermore implies that
ℓ < ℓ ≡ W
∗(F (v))
1−F (v) , as X
†(ℓ) = F (v).
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Lemma 1.10. Under Assumption 1.1, it holds that
Xc(ℓ) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
X◦(ℓ) if ℓ ∈ [0, ℓ);
X†(ℓ) if ℓ ∈ [ℓ, ℓ);
F (v) if ℓ ≥ ℓ.
Xc(ℓ) is decreasing for ℓ ∈ (0, ℓ), increasing for ℓ ∈ (ℓ, ℓ), and constant for ℓ ≥ ℓ.
Proof. Follows from the previous two Lemmata.
Lemma 1.11. Under Assumption 1.1 and for any ℓ < ℓ′, it holds that
• Σ(ℓ) ⊂ Σ(ℓ′) for ℓ, ℓ′ ∈ [0, ℓ]
• Σ(ℓ′) ⊂ Σ(ℓ) for ℓ, ℓ′ ∈ [ℓ, ℓ]
• Σ(ℓ) = Σ(ℓ′) for ℓ, ℓ′ > ℓ
Proof. From Lemmata 1.4 and 1.5, it follows that Σ(ℓ) = [θ, F−1(Xc(ℓ))]. As
F−1(X) is increasing under Assumption 1.1, the result follows from the previous
Lemma.
Lemma 1.12. The total expected rents of S and A are positive and decreasing in
ℓ for ℓ < ℓ and zero for ℓ ≥ ℓ.
Proof. The total expected rents of S and A are given by








By Lemma 1.10 and the definition of the intersection point X†(ℓ), this expression
is positive for ℓ < ℓ and zero for ℓ ≥ ℓ. For ℓ < ℓ, it holds that




By Lemma 1.10, this expression is negative.
Proof of Proposition 1.5 and Lemma 1.6
Consider the continuation play of the game starting at t = 1 after P has set T
and r and a weighted information structure Iα as defined in Lemma 1.4 and 1.5,
respectively. In any PBE of the game, A accepts any price offer that lies weakly
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above his costs. After a signal σ, the collusion-proofness constraint (CP ) in P ’s
problem implies that a price p = σ is optimal, as tA(σ, σ, θ)− θx(σ, σ, θ) = 0.
Furthermore, this is the uniquely optimal price. Any price p′ < σ results in a
payoff of T < 0. A price p′ ∈ (σ, θc(X)] gives a payoff of T+X(r−p′) < T+X(r−σ)
and any price p′ > θc(X) gives a payoff T+q(r−p′) < T+q(r−θc) < T+r−θc = 0
for some q ∈ [0, 1]. The continuation equilibrium at t = 1 is therefore unique and
the ex-ante probability of project realization is Xc. As the delegation contract
(T, r) equals the optimal collective transfers described in Lemmata 1.4 and 1.5, P
attains an expected payoff of W (Xc).
Proof of Proposition 1.6
Under delegation, P offers to S a contract which prescribes an initial payment of
T and an additional payment r contingent on project realization. After the signal
σ1, S offers A either a price p = 1 or a price p = 2. After the signal σ2, S offers
either p = 2 or p = 3. In any equilibrium, P ’s offer is accepted by S either after
both signals or only after the good signal σ1. This gives six types of equilibria
11
which need to be considered. I show that in all six cases, P ’s equilibrium payoff
under delegation is lower than 1. If P ignores S and contracts directly with A, she
can achieve an expected payoff of 43 . Thus, delegation is strictly suboptimal.
In the following, p(σ) denotes the price that S offers in equilibrium after ob-
serving the signal σ. I assume that ℓ is large enough such that the limited liability
constraint T ≥ −ℓ is never violated. Under this assumption, I show that P ’s ex-
pected payoff can never exceed 1. This implies that P ’s payoff is also lower than 1
for smaller values of ℓ.
At first, I consider the equilibria where S accepts P ’s offer after both signals.
In an equilibrium where S offers the prices p(σ1) = 1 and p(σ2) = 2, the expected
payoffs of S are US(σ1) = T +
2
3(r− 1) and US(σ2) = T +
1
3(r− 2). As S optimally
offers A a price of 2 for the signal σ2, it needs to hold that r ≥ 2. It follows that
US(σ1) = US(σ2) +
1
3r > US(σ2). P ’s expected payoff is





























r − US(σ2) ≤ 1,
11Not all six types of equilibria must necessarily exist.
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where the last inequality follows from the condition r ≥ 2 and S’s participation
constraint US(σ2) ≥ 0.
Consider now an equilibrium in which S offers A a price of 2 after both signals,
i.e. p(σ1) = p(σ2) = 2. This is optimal for S if
US(σ1) = T + r − 2 ≥ T +
2
3
(r − 1) ⇔ r ≥ 4 and
US(σ2) = T +
1
3
(r − 2) ≥ T + r − 3 ⇔ r ≤ 7
2
.
Thus, we have a contradiction which implies that there does not exist an equilibrium
with p(σ1) = p(σ2) = 2.
In the third type of equilibrium, A offers p(σ1) = 1 and p(σ2) = 3. This is
optimal for S if
US(σ1) = T +
2
3
(r − 1) ≥ T + r − 2 ⇔ r ≤ 4 and
US(σ2) = T + r − 3 ≥ T +
1
3
(r − 2) ⇔ r ≥ 7
2
.
As U1(σ1) = U1(σ2) +
1
3(7− r), P ’s payoff can be written as






(4− r)) + 1
2
















(7− r)− US(σ2) ≤ 1
where the last inequality follows from the participation constraint U1(σ2) ≥ 0 and
r ≤ 4.
In an equilibrium where S offers p(σ1) = 2 and p(σ2) = 3, it holds that US(σ1) =
T + r−2, US(σ2) = T + r−3, and US(σ1) = US(σ2)+1. In this case, P ’s expected
equilibrium payoff can be written as




(−T + 4− r) + 1
2








= 1− US(σ2) ≤ 1
where the last inequality follows from the participation constraint US(σ2) ≥ 0.
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I turn now to equilibria where S accepts P ’s offer only after the signal σ1. In









(4− 1)− US(σ1)) ≤ 1
where the last inequality follows from the participation constraint US(σ1)) ≥ 0. In
an equilibrium with p(σ1) = 2, P ’s expected payoff is
Pr(σ1)(−T + 4− r) =
1
2
(4− 2− US(σ1)) ≤ 1
by the participation constraint US(σ1)) ≥ 0.
Thus, delegation is strictly suboptimal under the information structure depicted
in Figure 1.6.
Statement and Proof of Proposition 1.7
Proposition 1.7. Suppose θ̃ is uniformly distributed on [0, 1] and v = 1. If ℓ is
low, S is becoming less informed as ℓ increases: For all ℓ, ℓ′ with 0 ≤ ℓ < ℓ′ ≤ ℓ̂
Iα(ℓ) ≻Blackwell Iα(ℓ′).
At first, I formally define a Blackwell ordering. Consider two information struc-
tures I1 and I2. Each information structure Ii = (Σi, µi) has an associated condi-
tional cdf Gi(θ|σ) for i ∈ {1, 2}. A garbling Γ ∈ ∆(Σ1 ×Σ2) is a joint cdf over the
two signal spaces. Γ induces a cdf over Σi conditional on σj ∈ Σj which I denote
by Γij(·|σj).

















I show now that there exists such a garbling for the information structures
I1 = I(ℓ1) and I2 = I(ℓ2) with 0 ≤ ℓ1 < ℓ2 ≤ ℓ. Both information structures are
characterized by a weight function denoted by αi(·) for the information structure
I(ℓi). I describe the garbling in terms of Γ21 which is illustrated in Figure 1.7.




















The information structure I1 is more informative in the sense of Blackwell if I2 can be replicated
by a garbling of the signals generated by I1. If the signal θ of I1 is smaller than the cutoff θ
◦(ℓ),
I2 generates the signal θ. If it is higher than the cutoff, a signal of I2 is drawn according to the
density a(·).
Suppose S receives the signal σ which is generated through the combination of
G1 and Γ21 as depicted in Figure 1.6. S’s belief over the type of A can then be
described by the cdf
GΓ(θ|σ) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
0 if θ < σ
f(σ)






1−F (θ◦(ℓ2)) if θ > θ
◦(ℓ2)
where Xi = 1− F (θ◦(ℓi)).
This garbling Γ is characterized by the weighting function a(·). If there exists
a weighting function a(·) such that GΓ(θ|σ) = G2(θ|σ), then I(ℓ1) ≻Blackwell I(ℓ2).
GΓ(θ|σ) = G2(θ|σ) holds for
a(θ) =
(1− F (θ◦(ℓ2)))α2(θ)− (1− F (θ◦(ℓ1)))α1(θ)
F (θ◦(ℓ1))− F (θ◦(ℓ2))
.
The equation defines a weight function if i)
∫
Σ2
a(σ)dσ = 1 and ii) a(σ) ≥ 0 for all
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F (θ◦(ℓ1))− F (θ◦(ℓ2))
=
(1− F (θ◦(ℓ2)))− (1− F (θ◦(ℓ1)))
F (θ◦(ℓ1))− F (θ◦(ℓ2))
= 1






ii) is satisfied if (1−F (θ◦(ℓ2)))α2(θ)− (1−F (θ◦(ℓ1)))α1(θ) ≥ 0. Using the defini-
tions of T , r, α(·), and θ̌ from Lemma 1.5, this is equivalent to
f(θ)
θ̌(ℓ2)− θ
θ◦(ℓ2) + ℓ2 − θ̌(ℓ2)
≥ f(θ) θ̌(ℓ1)− θ
θ◦(ℓ1) + ℓ1 − θ̌(ℓ1)
.
Thus, I(ℓ1) ≻Blackwell I(ℓ2) if θ̌(ℓ)−θθ◦(ℓ)+ℓ−θ̌(ℓ) is non-decreasing in ℓ.
If θ̃ is uniformly distributed on [0, 1] and v = 1, it is easy to check from the
definitions of θ◦(ℓ) and θ̌(ℓ) that θ◦(ℓ) = 0.5(1− ℓ) and θ̌(ℓ) = 0.5(
√
3− 1)(1 + ℓ).
It follows that
θ̌(ℓ)− θ










3− 1)(1 + ℓ)
which is increasing in ℓ.






This chapter is based on Asseyer (2016b).
2.1 Introduction
Public procurement constitutes a sizable part of economic activity in advanced
economies. In 2013 the average OECD country spent 29% of total government
expenditure on public procurement. This represents, on average, 12.1% of GDI
(OECD, 2015a). The potential cost savings through more efficient public pro-
curement procedures are large.1 In the aftermath of the Great Recession – as
many governments have been forced to reduce their debt – international organiza-
tions such as the OECD and national audit offices have urged public institutions
to adopt better procurement procedures (NAO/OGC, 2008; GAO, 2013; OECD,
2015b). Among other measures for the effective management of public procure-
ment, these organisations stress the importance of monitoring. In particular, they
recommend monitoring the cost developments and other performance measures of
private suppliers. However, monitoring is costly and not all sources of additional
information help government institutions to manage public contracts effectively.2
This poses the question of what kind of information a government institution
should monitor in order to optimally manage public contracts. I analyze this
1Cost savings of 1% of public procurement expenditure represents 43 billion EUR across OECD
countries (OECD, 2015b).
2For example, a large number of performance indicators (NAO, 2014) did not prevent the
overbilling of the companies G4S and Serco in the UK.
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question in a principal-agent model of procurement where the agent can produce
a good for the principal. Prior to production, the agent can make a cost-reducing
investment at a privately known cost. Production costs are determined by the
investment and a cost shock. This shock represents the agent’s uncertainty of
production costs at the time of making the investment. The principal can monitor
the agent’s investment decision, the cost shock or both at a cost.
I show that it is never optimal for the principal to monitor both. Furthermore,
the principal achieves at least the same payoff – gross monitoring costs – if she
monitors investment as though she was monitoring the shock. Both instruments
perform equally well if the investment decision is close to being efficient.
The model captures two important aspects of public procurement projects.
First, cost-reducing investments and the sequential, private learning of production
costs are realistic features of many procurement contexts. Procurement contracts
frequently run for several years. This is the case for construction projects of airports
and high-speed internet networks as well as the management and maintenance
of public facilities such as hospitals and highways.3 Furthermore, suppliers can
often make cost-reducing investments at an early stage of the project, e.g. at
the planning phase. These investments influence the total costs of the project
completion. Additionally, production costs are influenced by exogenous cost factors
that suppliers observe after the investment decision. Examples of such factors
include ground conditions and input prices for construction projects, and weather
conditions for maintenance contracts. The model reflects both the dynamic aspect
of learning during procurement contracts and the opportunity to invest in cost
reductions.
Secondly, monitoring plays a central role in the management of public procure-
ment projects. Suppliers’ investment decisions can be monitored using key perfor-
mance indicators such as quality milestones (Garvin et al., 2011). Exogenous cost
factors can be monitored by third-party experts.4 In practice, government agencies
monitor a wide variety of outcomes. Typically, these outcomes can be classified
as either endogenous or exogenous cost factors. In this chapter, I focus on the
monitoring of investments and cost shocks as relevant examples for each type.
I solve the principal’s problem by analyzing optimal contracts under the dif-
ferent monitoring regimes. If the agent’s investment decision is monitored, the
principal first has to elicit the investment cost and then the value of the shock.
The principal’s optimal contract induces underinvestment and efficient production
3In the UK, public-private partnerships under the scheme of the Private Finance Initiative
usually run for 20 to 30 years (HMT, 2012).
4For instance, the Canadian government has employed KPMG as a third-party expert for a
national shipbuilding procurement project (PWGSC, 2013).
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of the good independently of the investment decision. The two sources of asym-
metric information can be treated separately. The agent knows his investment cost
before a contract is signed. Thus, the principal has to give an information rent
to the agent and therefore distorts the investment decision. In contrast, the cost
shock is realized after the parties have signed a contract. The principal does not
have to give any rent to the agent for this information. She can induce efficient
production and extract the surplus with a fixed fee. This implies that the principal
has nothing to gain by monitoring both the cost shock and the investment decision.
If only the shock is monitored, the principal has to elicit the investment cost
and induce the appropriate investment decision. Moral hazard concerning the
investment decision is irrelevant if the distortion in the investment decision is not
too large. The previously optimal contract is then still implementable. In contrast,
if the principal wishes to implement a large distortion in investment, moral hazard
becomes relevant. In this case, the optimal contract features distortions in the
investment and the production decision.
Finally, I analyze the optimal contract without monitoring. The principal
achieves a strictly smaller payoff than in the case where the shock is monitored. If
the principal does not monitor, the agent can play double deviations by combining
a deviation in the investment decision with a false report on the cost shock. Such
deviations are not possible if the shock is monitored and they decrease the prin-
cipal’s payoff. This contrasts with the case where investment is monitored. Here,
the agent cannot benefit from false reports about the cost shock. The unobserved
investment decision ’connects’ the two sources of private information. The prin-
cipal cannot separate them as in the case of investment monitoring. The optimal
contract without monitoring induces two types of inefficiencies: underinvestment
in cost reduction and underproduction.
These results have the following implications for the optimal monitoring policy.
First, the principal monitors either the shock or the investment decision. Second,
monitoring investment is always at least as effective as monitoring the shock. Third,
the principal can sometimes achieve the same payoff (gross monitoring costs) under
the two monitoring regimes. This is the case if the distortion in the investment
decision is not too high.
Following the seminal work by Laffont and Tirole (1986), an important part
of the literature on procurement contracting assumes that the principal observes
the production costs of the agent.5 This chapter contributes to the literature
on monitoring in principal-agent models, in which the principal’s information is
determined endogenously. Maskin and Riley (1985) and Khalil and Lawarrée (1995)
5See also Laffont and Tirole (1993).
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analyze the question of input-vs-output monitoring, where a principal can monitor
either an agent’s effort or his realized return. Dewatripont and Maskin (1995)
show that a principal may optimally restrict what he can monitor in order to avoid
renegotiation. Khalil (1997) analyzes a principal-agent model where the principal
cannot commit to the monitoring policy. Strausz (1997) looks at the delegation of
monitoring to a third party under limited commitment. This chapter is the first to
provide an analysis of the monitoring of post-contractual private information and
moral hazard under full commitment.6
This chapter is also related to the literature on R&D and optimal procurement
mechanisms which was initiated by Tan (1992), Piccione and Tan (1996), and Bag
(1997). They analyze competitive procurement mechanisms when suppliers can
invest in cost-reducing R&D. As the investment decision in this chapter can be
interpreted as an investment in R&D, the contribution to this literature lies in
analyzing the effect of unobserved and cost-reducing R&D on dynamic information
rents. Cisternas and Figueroa (2015) analyze the optimal procurement mechanism
when a buyer procures two projects sequentially and the winner of the first round
can invest in cost reduction before the second round. Liu and Lu (2015) analyze
optimal contracts in a model of procurement with an unobservable R&D effort in
cost reduction under dynamic adverse selection.
A further related literature studies optimal contracts for public-private part-
nerships (PPP). Iossa and Martimort (2012, 2015) analyze when a public buyer
should delegate the design and the implementation of a project to the same firm –
which corresponds to a PPP – or different firms – such as under traditional forms
of procurement. Hoppe and Schmitz (2013) analyze the implication of this decision
for innovative procurement. Engel et al. (2013) study optimal contracts for PPPs
from a public finance perspective. Closely related to the current chapter, Iossa and
Martimort (2016) study optimal contracts for a PPP where a single supplier has
private information and a moral hazard decision after contracting. In contrast to
the current chapter, they consider a risk-averse supplier who has no private infor-
mation at the outset of the contractual relationship. Furthermore, they study the
benefit of complete contracts over incomplete contracts, where only complete con-
tracts condition on communication with the supplier. Public-private partnerships
are frequently used for the realization of mid to long-term procurement projects
where learning of new information and cost-reducing investments by suppliers play
an important role. This chapter contributes to the literature by providing an ex-
plicit analysis of the optimal monitoring policies for a government authority that
6In contrast to the literature on costly state verification initiated by Townsend (1979), the
principal here decides ex-ante which information of the agent to observe.
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is entering into a public-private partnership with a private supplier.
This chapter is furthermore related to the literature on information rents in
dynamic principal-agent models. In models of dynamic adverse selection, Baron
and Besanko (1984), Eső and Szentes (2007a,b), and Pavan et al. (2014) show
that the principal does not have to give rents for the private information that
agents learn after contracting. Krähmer and Strausz (2015) qualify this insight
by showing that an agent receives post-contractual information rents if the set of
signal realizations learned before contracting is discrete. Baron and Besanko (1984)
and Eső and Szentes (2015) argue that privacy of post-contractual information may
also be irrelevant in the presence of dynamic adverse selection and moral hazard.
I show that their result does not extend to the setting in the current chapter. I
elaborate on this point in the discussion section.
In the following section I introduce the model. Section 2.3 presents the optimal
contract when the principal monitors the investment decision. Section 2.4 considers
the case where the principal monitors the shock. Section 2.5 analyzes the optimal
contracts without monitoring. Section 2.6 presents and analyzes the optimal mon-
itoring policy. Section 2.7 discusses the role of post-contractual information rents
and the robustness of the results. Section 2.8 concludes.
2.2 The model
A government institution (the principal) can procure a good from a supplier (the
agent). The principal values the good by v. Prior to production, the agent can
make a cost-reducing investment decision x ∈ {0, 1}. The investment decision leads
to investment costs of κ · x to the agent. κ is the private information of the agent
and is drawn from an interval [κ, κ] ⊂ R+ according to the distribution function F .
F has a log-concave density function f , so that F (κ)/f(κ) is weakly increasing and
(1− F (κ))/f(κ) is weakly decreasing (Bagnoli and Bergstrom, 2005). The agent’s
production cost is determined by the investment decision x and a shock ε that is
realized after the investment is made. The production cost is given by cx(ε). For
both x ∈ {0, 1}, the function cx(·) has the image [c, c] ⊂ R, is strictly increasing and
twice continuously differentiable. Without loss of generality I assume that the shock
ε is uniformly distributed on the unit interval.7 The investment is cost-reducing in
the sense that c1(ε) < c0(ε) for all ε ∈ (0, 1). Furthermore, let v ∈ (c, c). There
are two simple monitoring technologies. The principal can perfectly observe the
7If the shock ϵ leading to production costs ĉx(ϵ) is distributed according to a continuous and
strictly increasing distribution function H on some interval, then the random variable ε ≡ H(ϵ) is
uniformly distributed on [0, 1]. The cost functions can be redefined as cx(ε) = cx(H(ϵ)) ≡ ĉx(ϵ).
An assumption on cx(·) would then translate into a joint assumption on ĉx(·) and H.
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investment decision x at a monitoring cost Ci > 0, and the shock ε at a monitoring
cost Cs > 0. I assume that the principal cannot monitor probabilistically.8 Both
parties are risk-neutral and have outside options associated with a payoff of zero.
Let q be the probability of production and t be a transfer. The agent’s payoff is
t − cx(ε)q − κx and the principal’s payoff gross monitoring costs is vq − t. The
timing of the game is as follows:
i) The agent learns κ.
ii) The principal decides what to monitor and offers a contract. The agent
observes the principal’s decision and accepts or rejects the contract. If the
agent chooses reject, the game ends and both parties receive zero payoffs.
Otherwise, the game continues.
iii) The agent makes the investment decision x.
iv) The shock ε is realized.
v) The agent can produce the good.
Complete information benchmark
Suppose the investment cost κ, the investment decision x, and the shock ε are
publicly observed. In this case, the principal can extract the whole social surplus.
For any κ, she chooses the investment decision and the probability of production,





(v − cx(ε))qx(ε)dε− κ · x
Independently of the investment decision, the principal procures the good from the
agent if her valuation lies above the production costs: v ≥ cx(ε) for x ∈ {0, 1}. I
denote the thresholds of the shock by ε∗x which satisfy cx(ε
∗
x) = v with x ∈ {0, 1}.
The principal induces the cost-reducing investment if the investment cost lies below








κ∗ is the efficient investment cutoff and it equals the additional social surplus that
is generated through the investment. I assume κ∗ ∈ (κ, κ).
8An alternative assumption is that the principal has to spend Ci or Cs to install the moni-
toring technology independently of whether it is used later on and the agent observes whenever a
monitoring technology is installed.
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The costs of the agent are depicted as a function of the shock for both investment decisions. The
areas A and B represents the social benefit of investment gross investment costs under efficient
production decisions.
Graphically, κ∗ can be represented as the areas A and B in Figure 2.1. In
this figure, the production costs of the agent are depicted as functions of the cost
shock for both investment decisions x = 0 and x = 1. Area A represents the
expected cost savings of the investment for values of the cost shock under which
the good is produced independently of the investment decision. Area B represents
the additional social value of production for values of the cost shock where the
good is only produced if the agent invests.
2.3 Monitoring investment
In this section, I analyze the principal’s optimal contract when she monitors the
agent’s investment decision. For now, I assume that the principal monitors the
investment and the cost shock. In that case, she only needs to elicit the investment
cost from the agent. I solve for the optimal allocation. I then show that this allo-
cation can be implemented with the same expected transfers even if the principal
monitors only the investment and not the cost shock. This shows that the principal
has nothing to gain from monitoring the cost shock when she is also monitoring
the investment decision.
The principal offers the agent a menu of two contracts. The first contract
requires the agent to invest and fixes a probability of production q1(ε) and an
expected transfer t1(ε) as functions of the shock. The second contract requires the
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agent not to invest and fixes the probability of production q0(ε) and the expected
transfer t0(ε). I denote the expected payoff of the contract (qx(ε), tx(ε)) – gross




(tx(ε)− cx(ε)qx(ε)) dε, (2.1)
for x ∈ {0, 1}. An agent with investment cost κ chooses the first contract if and
only if U1 − κ ≥ U0. I denote by κ̂ the threshold at which the agent is indifferent
between the two contracts. The threshold thus satisfies κ̂ = U1 − U0. The agent
participates if at least one of the contracts gives him a higher payoff than his outside
option. The principal’s expected payoff from the menu of contracts is
Π ≡ F (κ̂)
∫ 1
0




The first term represents the expected payoff if the agent invests, the second term
is the expected payoff if the agent does not invest. Using equation (2.1), the
principal’s payoff can be expressed as a function of the probability of production,
the investment threshold, and the expected payoffs of the agent from the two
contracts. Using furthermore the relationship between expected payoffs and the
investment threshold, the principal’s expected payoff can be written as
Π̃ ≡ F (κ̂)
(∫ 1
0
(v − c1(ε))q1(ε)dε− κ̂
)
(2.2)






The principal chooses the probabilities of production q1(·) and q0(·) and the invest-
ment threshold κ̂ in order to maximize her expected payoff – subject to the partic-
ipation constraint U0 ≥ 0. It is optimal for the principal to make the participation
constraint of the non-investing agent binding. Furthermore, the principal procures
the good from the agent if and only if it is efficient and sets q∗x(ε) ≡ 1(ε ≤ ε∗x) for











and κi < κ∗. The principal induces investment if the social surplus generated by
investment exceeds the virtual investment costs. I denote by Πi the payoff that
the principal achieves. In contrast to the case with complete information, the
principal needs to give an information rent to the agent for the private information
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on the investment cost. The principal faces an efficiency-rent extraction trade-off
and distorts the investment decision. Whereas if the principal chooses efficient
production conditional on the investment, the induced investment decision leads
to underinvestment.
The optimal allocation can be implemented at the same revenue by a menu
of contracts under which the production decision is delegated to the agent. The
first contract prescribes investment, the second contract prohibits investment. In
both contracts the agent decides whether to produce the good at price v. The first




(v − c1(ε))dε− κi.





These contracts implement the principal’s optimal investment decisions and allo-
cations. As the principal can delegate the production decision to the agent, the
contracts do not require the principal to observe the shock. I state this first result
as a proposition.
Proposition 2.1. If investment is monitored, the principal has nothing to gain
from monitoring the shock.
Because the shock is statistically independent of the investment cost, the princi-
pal can extract the private information on the shock from the agent without giving
up any rent. Therefore, the principal cannot increase her payoff by monitoring the
shock in addition to the investment. This reflects the result by Baron and Besanko
(1984). In the following sections I show that the situation is different if investment
is unobservable.
2.4 Monitoring the shock
In the following I suppose that the principal monitors only the shock. Under
this monitoring policy, the optimal contract needs to give the agent incentives to
reveal his costs of investment and to take the right investment decision. I show
that moral hazard concerning the investment decision may be irrelevant. In this
case, the principal can achieve the same payoff – gross monitoring costs – as in
the case where she monitors investment. If moral hazard is relevant, the principal
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optimally chooses to introduce underproduction by non-investing agents in order
to reduce rent payments to investing agents. In this case, the optimal contract
features investment and production distortions.
The principal offers a menu of two contracts. One contract should be chosen by
the agent if he invests, and the other contract is for the agent if he does not invest.
Both contracts fix a probability of production qx(ε) and an expected transfer tx(ε)
for x ∈ {0, 1}.9 Denote by Kx the set of all values of the investment cost for which
the agent takes the investment decision x in equilibrium. A menu of contracts is
incentive compatible if an agent with investment costs in Kx finds it optimal to
choose the contract (qx(·), tx(·)) and the action x. A menu of contracts is individual
rational if the agent always prefers one of the contracts over rejecting the principal’s
offer. Formally, if the principal monitors the shock, incentive compatibility and
individual rationality require∫ 1
0




(tx′(ε)− cx′′(ε)qx′(ε)) dε− κx′′, 0
}
for κ ∈ Kx and x, x′, x′′ ∈ {0, 1}.
Let Ux be the agent’s expected payoff from the contract (qx(·), tx(·)) gross
investment cost. The joint condition of incentive compatibility and individual
rationality can then be expressed as





(cx′(ε)− cx′′(ε))qx′(ε)dε− κx′′, 0
}
(2.3)
for κ ∈ Kx and x, x′, x′′ ∈ {0, 1}. Incentive compatibility and individual rationality
can be characterized as follows.
Lemma 2.1. If the principal monitors the shock, a menu of contracts is incentive
compatible and individual rational if and only if for some κ̂ ∈ [κ, κ]
1. K1 = [κ, κ̂], K0 = (κ̂, κ], and U1 − U0 = κ̂;
2. U0 ≥ 0;
3.
∫ 1
0 (c0(ε)− c1(ε))q0(ε)dε ≤ κ̂;
4.
∫ 1
0 (c0(ε)− c1(ε))q1(ε)dε ≥ κ̂.
9The revelation principle due to Myerson (1986) allows us to focus on truthful direct mecha-
nisms with random recommendations concerning the investment decision. The contracts studied
here are mechanisms with deterministic recommendations, i.e., investment decisions. Under the
assumptions on F and assumptions 2.1 and 2.2, this can be shown to be without loss of optimality.
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If the agent optimally invests at some level of investment cost, then it is still
optimal to invest if the investment costs are lower. This implies condition 1. Con-
dition 2 guarantees individual rationality: Independently of the level of investment
cost, the agent can always achieve a net benefit of U0. If U0 is better than the out-
side option, the agent always accepts one of the contract offers. Under condition 3,
agents with low investment costs have no incentive to choose the contract aimed at
non-investing agents and to invest nevertheless. With this deviation, the agent for-
goes the rent provided under the contract (q1(·), t1(·)) but can keep any reduction
in production costs. The rent therefore needs to exceed the reduced costs. Con-
versely, under condition 4, it is unprofitable for agents with high investment costs
to pick the contract for investing agents and to abstain from investment. In this
deviation, the agent picks the contract (q1(·), t1(·)) and receives the rent payment
associated with it. However, he incurs a loss as he produces with the less-efficient
production technology. The allocation is incentive compatible if this loss exceeds
the rent.
By condition 1 in Lemma 2.1, the expected payoff of the principal can be
expressed as in equation (2.2). The optimal menu of contracts for the principal is
therefore the solution of the following problem:
max
U0,κ̂,(qx(·))x∈{0,1}
Π̃ s.t. conditions 2 to 4 in Lemma 2.1 (2.4)
This problem is equivalent to the principal’s problem under the monitoring of in-
vestment and shock with the additional constraints 3 and 4. The principal cannot
achieve a higher payoff (gross monitoring costs) than under investment monitor-
ing. However, she achieves the same payoff if conditions 3 and 4 are not binding at
the optimum. The optimal investment and production decisions from the optimal
contract with investment monitoring always satisfy condition 4. Furthermore, con-
dition 3 is satisfied if the distortion away from the first best investment decision is
not too large:
Proposition 2.2. If the shock is monitored, the principal can implement the in-
vestment decision characterized by the threshold κi and efficient production with
the same expected transfers as under investment monitoring if and only if
κi ≥ κ∗ −
∫ ε∗1
ε∗0
(v − c1(ε))dε. (2.5)
If this condition is violated, moral hazard is relevant. In this case, the unob-
servability of the investment decision adds agency costs to the principal’s problem.
This is the case if the best deviation of an agent with low investment costs – i.e.,
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κ ∈ K1 – is to choose the contract (q0(·), t0(·)) and invest nevertheless. Under ef-
ficient production, the benefit of this deviation (gross investment cost) is given by
the area A in Figure 2.1. A represents the expected cost savings that the agent can
keep for himself when deviating. If this area is smaller than the rent κi that the
agent receives in the optimal contract under investment monitoring, then moral
hazard is irrelevant. Equation (2.5) expresses this comparison – using the fact
that the sum of areas A and B in Figure 2.1 equal κ∗. The reformulation shows
that moral hazard is irrelevant if the principal wants to implement a large invest-
ment threshold which is close to the efficient investment threshold. In contrast, if
the principal aims to implement a small investment threshold, then moral hazard
becomes relevant.
If moral hazard is relevant, the principal could still implement efficient pro-
duction. In this case, the principal would have to give the investing agent a rent
equal to the area A in Figure 2.1. This would imply an investment threshold equal
to the area A. This threshold would be higher than the optimal threshold under
monitoring of the investment decision.











If the principal monitors the shock and moral hazard is relevant, the principal reduces the cutoff
from the efficient value ε∗0 to ε0 to reduce the information rent of the agent from area A in
Figure 2.1 to the area A′.
The principal can increase her payoff by reducing the probability of production
for the agent who does not invest. As illustrated in Figure 2.2, this allows the
principal to profitably reduce the rent of the investing agent to the area A′. The
investment cost threshold is also affected because the agent’s investment is optimal
as long as the investment costs are smaller than the area A′. Note that it is never
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beneficial for the principal to push the threshold down to κi, the optimal thresh-
old under monitoring of investment. At this threshold, the principal is indifferent
between trading efficiently with an investing agent or with a non-investing agent.
However, production with non-investing agents is inefficient under the threshold κi
if moral hazard is relevant. The principal therefore prefers a strictly higher thresh-
old. The optimal threshold is also strictly smaller than the efficient investment
threshold κ∗. This follows from the observation that the area A′ in Figure 2.2 is
smaller than the area A in Figure 2.1, whereas the efficient investment threshold
equals the sum of the areas A and B in Figure 2.1. It follows that the optimal
contract under shock monitoring and the relevant moral hazard includes inefficient
production by non-investing agents and a smaller distortion in the investment de-
cision than in the optimal contract with investment monitoring.
In order to characterize the optimal contract, it is helpful to define – for any
given incentive compatible and individual rational menu of contracts that imple-
ments an investment threshold κ̂ – the principal’s gain from investment by the
agent with investment cost κ ≤ κ̂:
G(q1(·), q0(·), κ̂) ≡
∫ 1
0
(v − c1(ε))q1(ε)dε− κ̂−
∫ 1
0
(v − c0(ε))q0(ε)dε. (2.6)
If an agent with investment cost κ invests, the principal can extract the expected
social surplus of
∫ 1
0 (v − c1(ε))q1(ε)dε − κ, reduced by the rent κ̂ − κ. If the same
agent does not invest, the principal does not give an information rent and receives
the social surplus of
∫ 1
0 (v−c0(ε))q0(ε)dε. G(·, ·, ·) is therefore the part of the social
value of the investment which the principal can appropriate.
A potential deviation of an agent with a low investment cost is the following:
Select contract (q0(·), t0(·)) instead of contract (q1(·), t1(·)) and choose the invest-
ment decision x = 1. The agent can then keep the reduction in production costs
due to the investment for himself. If moral hazard is relevant then this deviation is
attractive and the agent has to be given an information rent equal to the reduction
in production costs. Formally, condition 3 of Lemma 2.1 is binding in the optimal
contract. The investing agent therefore receives a rent (gross investment cost) of




This rent is equal to the investment threshold by condition 1 in Lemma 2.1. With
slight abuse of notation, I denote by U s1 (ε0) the agent’s rent for q0(ε) = 1(ε ≤ ε0),
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and by
us1(ε0) = c0(ε0)− c1(ε0)
the first derivative. us1(ε0) is the marginal change in the agent’s rent if the good is
produced for a shock of size ε0. The principal maximizes the virtual surplus–which
is the difference between the social surplus and the rent of the agent. Under the
following assumption, the virtual surplus is decreasing in the cost shock.
Assumption 2.1. v − c0(ε)− (F (κ∗)/(1− F (κ∗))) · us1(ε) is decreasing in ε.10
The principal then chooses the following menu of contracts under shock moni-
toring.
Proposition 2.3. If the shock is monitored and Assumption 2.1 is satisfied, the
principal achieves an optimal payoff Πs through the menu of contracts
{(qs1(·), ts1(·)), (qs0(·), ts0(·)} and the investment threshold κs:
1. If moral hazard is irrelevant, then production is efficient and the investment
threshold is the same as with monitoring of the investment: qsx(·) = q∗x(·) for
x ∈ {0, 1}, and κs = κi.
2. If moral hazard is relevant, then production is efficient if the agent invests. If
the agent does not invest, there is underproduction. The investment threshold
is lower than efficient and higher than with monitoring of the investment:




(c0(ε)− c1(ε))dε ∈ (κi, κ∗); (2.8)










0 (v − cx(ε))q
s
x(ε)dε − x · κs
for x ∈ {0, 1}.
Moral hazard connects the production decision of non-investing agents and the
investment cutoff. As illustrated in Figure 2.2, the principal can reduce the pro-
duction probability of non-investing agent below the efficient cutoff. This reduces
the information rent of the agent, but it also reduces the efficiency of production
and the probability that the agent invests.
10This assumption is similar to standard assumptions made in the literature on sequential screen-
ing (Courty and Li, 2000). It is satisfied if κ∗ is small enough.
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Formally, the principal’s trade-off can be seen from equation (2.9): The left-
hand side captures the marginal beneficial effects on the principal’s payoff when the
good is procured for the shock ε and the right-hand side represents the marginal
adverse effects. The first term on the left-hand side is the marginal increase in
social surplus. The term on the right-hand side is the marginal increase in the
agent’s rent. The marginal effect on gross rents increases the fraction of agents
who invest. This effect is beneficial for the principal and is captured by the second
term on the left-hand side. In contrast to a standard adverse selection problem
with an efficient and an inefficient type, the fraction of the efficient, i.e., investing,
agents is endogenous to the mechanism.
2.5 No monitoring
In this section, I analyze the principal’s optimal contract when there is no moni-
toring. In this case, the principal needs to elicit information on investment costs
and the shock from the agent. At the same time, the optimal contract needs to
provide incentives to the agent to take the right investment decision.
I show that without monitoring, the principal achieves a strictly lower payoff –
gross monitoring costs – than by using either monitoring technology. Both sources
of agency costs, moral hazard concerning the investment decision, and adverse
selection concerning the cost shock, are therefore always relevant. The optimal
contract induces underinvestment and underproduction of non-investing agents.
The principal offers a menu of two contracts. The first contract targets the
agent who is making the investment, the second contract is designed for the agent
who does not invest. Both contracts specify a probability of production qx(ε
′)
and an expected transfer tx(ε
′) as functions of a report ε′ on the shock for both
investment decisions x ∈ {0, 1}.11 Kx be the set of investment cost values for which
the agent takes the decision x in equilibrium.
Incentive compatibility regarding the shock requires the following: A truthful
report on the cost shock has to be optimal for an agent who has selected the correct
contract and the appropriate investment decision. Formally, this implies
tx(ε)− cx(ε)qx(ε) ≥ tx(ε′)− cx(ε)qx(ε′) (2.10)
for all ε, ε′ ∈ [0, 1] and x ∈ {0, 1}.
Incentive compatibility regarding the whole menu of contracts requires that the
agent with investment cost in Kx chooses the investment decision x, the contract
11See comment in footnote 9.
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(qx(·), tx(·)), and reports ε truthfully. The menu of contracts is individually rational
if the agent always prefers one of the contracts to his outside option. The joint
condition of incentive compatibility and individual rationality under no monitoring
can be expressed as∫ 1
0












for all κ ∈ Kx, x, x′, x′′ ∈ {0, 1}. For the characterization of this constraint, it is
helpful to make the following observation: An agent who has chosen the contract
for the investment decision x but has made the decision x′ falsely reports on the
shock. The false report is optimally chosen such that the principal has a correct
belief about production costs.
Lemma 2.2. Incentive compatibility regarding the shock implies




for all x, x′ ∈ {0, 1} and all ε ∈ [0, 1].
After a deviation, the agent optimally corrects his previous lie. Suppose the
agent picks the contract (qx(·), tx(·)) and deviates to the investment decision x′.
For a report ε′, the principal believes that the agent has the production costs cx(ε
′),
whereas the agent has the true production costs cx′(ε). Lemma 2.2 implies that the
agent optimally chooses ε′ such that the principal holds the correct belief about
the agent’s production cost, i.e., cx(ε
′) = cx′(ε). This result is most intuitive for
the case where each contract stipulates a strike price rx which the agent receives
if the good is produced. On the equilibrium path, the agent makes a report that
induces production if cx(ε) ≤ rx. On a deviation path, the agent makes such a
report if cx′(ε) ≤ rx. It is then straightforward to see that the report ε′ such that
cx(ε
′) = cx′(ε) is optimal for the agent on the deviation path.
Using the result from Lemma 2.2, incentive compatibility and individual ratio-
nality can be characterized.
Lemma 2.3. If the principal does not monitor, a menu of contracts is incentive
compatible and individual rational if and only if for some κ̂ ∈ [κ, κ]
1. K1 = [κ, κ̂], K0 = (κ̂, κ], and U1 − U0 = κ̂;
2. U0 ≥ 0;














0 (c1(ε)))dε ≥ κ̂;
5. qx(ε) is decreasing in ε and




Conditions 3, 4, and 5 differ from Lemma 2.1. Conditions 3 and 4 reflect that
the agent optimally lies about the shock on a deviation path where the agent takes
a different investment decision than in equilibrium. Condition 3 ensures that an
agent with a low investment cost has no incentive to select contract (q0(·), t0(·)),
to invest nevertheless, and to combine this deviation with a false report on ε. The
left-hand side of condition 3 corresponds to the areas A′ and B′ in Figure 2.3,
when the probability of production is q0(ε0) = 1(ε ≤ ε0). The area A′ represents
the cost reduction which the agent realizes for values of the cost shock where
the good is produced under both contracts. The area B′ is an additional gain,
since the probability of production is higher on the equilibrium path due to the
opportunity to misreport the cost shock. Similarly, under condition 4 the agent
with high investment costs does not gain from choosing the contract (q1(·), t1(·)),
making the investment decision x = 0, and misreporting the cost shock. Condition
5 follows from standard monotonicity and revenue equivalence requirements that
are necessary and sufficient for incentive compatibility regarding the shock.
Due to condition 1, the principal’s payoff from an incentive compatible menu
of contracts can be expressed as in equation (2.2). The principal’s problem is then
max
U0,κ̂,(qx(·))x∈{0,1}
Π̃ s.t. conditions 2 to 5 in Lemma 2.3. (2.12)
Can the principal still implement the investment and production decisions from
the optimal contracts with monitoring? This turns out to be impossible.
Proposition 2.4. Without monitoring, efficient production q∗x(·) for x ∈ {0, 1}
is incentive compatible only if the investment threshold is efficient: κ̂ = κ∗. Fur-
thermore, the optimal investment and production decisions under monitoring the
shock {qs1(·), qs0(·), κs} do not satisfy the joint condition of incentive compatibility
and individual rationality without monitoring.
If the principal offers a contract that stipulates efficient production, incentive
compatibility requires the agent to be willing to produce after either investment
decision and to make a report that induces production as long as cx(ε) ≤ v. This
66 2.5. NO MONITORING
implies that an agent who deviates by choosing the menu (q0(·), t0(·)) and the
investment decision x = 1, finds it optimal to make a report ε′ ≤ ε∗0 and to induce
production as long as c1(ε) ≤ v, i.e., as long as production is efficient. On this
deviation path, the agent receives the whole social surplus generated through the
investment. This corresponds to the sum of the areas A and B in Figure 2.1. The
principal could still implement efficient production but has to leave a rent equal
to A + B to an investing agent. Therefore, the agent will invest as long as his
investment cost lies below the efficient investment cost threshold κ∗.












Without monitoring the principal reduces the cutoff from the efficient value ε∗0 to ε0 to reduce the
information rent of the agent from area A+B in Figure 2.1 to the area A′ +B′.
Suppose now that the principal implements the production decisions from the
optimal contract under monitoring the shock. Without monitoring, this results in
a strictly higher investment threshold than under shock monitoring. Figure 2.3
illustrates this result: Given the production threshold ε0, investing agents receive a
rent (gross investment costs) equal to area A′ if the principal monitors the shock. If
the principal does not monitor, the rent increases to areas A′ and B′. The optimal
investment threshold under monitoring the shock is therefore no longer feasible.
In the optimal contract without monitoring, the principal introduces under-
production for non-investing agents. As illustrated in Figure 2.3, this reduces the
information rent of an investing agent to the sum of areas A′ and B′. The in-
vestment cost threshold equals the sum of these areas and therefore lies below the
efficient threshold κ∗. However, it is never optimal for the principal to push the
investment threshold below the optimal level with monitoring of investment κi, as
production by non-investing agents is inefficient.
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It follows that the agent’s most attractive deviation strategy is to select the
contract for non-investing agents, invest nevertheless, and misreport the cost shock
such that the principal holds the correct belief about production costs. Formally,
this implies that condition 3 in Lemma 2.3 is satisfied with equality in the optimal
menu of contracts. The investing agent’s rent, gross investment cost, is therefore







I denote by Un1 (ε0) the agent’s rent for q0(ε) = 1(ε ≤ ε0), and by





the first derivative. I make an assumption that ensures that the principal benefits
from a lower shock in the optimal contract. Technically speaking, this assumption
ensures that the virtual surplus is decreasing in the shock ε.
Assumption 2.2. v − c0(ε)− (F (κ∗)/(1− F (κ∗))) · un1 (ε) is decreasing in ε.12
Without monitoring, the principal offers the following menu of contracts.
Proposition 2.5. If there is no monitoring and Assumption 2.2 is satisfied, the
principal achieves an optimal payoff Πn through the menu of contracts
{(qn1 (·), tn1 (·)), (qn0 (·), tn0 (·))} and the investment threshold κn: If the agent invests,
production is efficient. If the agent does not invest, there is underproduction. The
investments threshold is lower than efficient and higher than with investment mon-
itoring. For x ∈ {0, 1}






1 (c0(ε))− ε)dε ∈ (κ
i, κ∗); (2.14)
(1− F (κn))(v − c0(εn0 )) + f(κn)G(qn1 (·), qn0 (·), κn)un1 (εn0 ) (2.15)
















n · x. (2.16)
The principal faces again an efficiency-rent extraction trade-off. If the prin-
cipal reduces non-investing agents’ probability of production below the efficient
level then the rent payment to investing agents can be reduced. This is illus-
trated in Figure 2.3. However, this reduces the efficiency of the production decision
12Like Assumption 2.1, this is satisfied if κ∗ is small enough.
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for non-investing agents and decreases the fraction of investing agents. Formally,
the principal’s trade-off is reflected in equation (2.15). On the left-hand side are
the marginal beneficial effects of production by non-investing types at shock ε: a
marginal increase in efficiency and the marginal gain from the increase in the frac-
tion of investing agent types. The right-hand side reflects the marginal increase in
rent payments that have to be given to the agent. In the next section, I analyze
the implications for the principal’s optimal monitoring policy. Assumptions 2.1
and 2.2 are maintained throughout the section.
2.6 The optimal monitoring policy
It is straightforward to derive the implications for the optimal choice of a monitoring
policy.
Proposition 2.6. The principal’s optimal monitoring policy is given by:
• no monitoring if Ci ≥ Πi −Πn and Cs > Πs −Πn;
• monitoring the shock if Cs ≤ min
{
Ci +Πs −Πi,Πs −Πn
}
;
• monitoring the investment if Ci < min
{
Cs +Πi −Πs,Πi −Πn
}
.
There exist monitoring costs Ci > 0 and Cs > 0 such that each monitoring regime
can be optimal.
The principal finds her optimal monitoring policy by comparing the payoffs
net of monitoring costs under the different monitoring regimes. This gives the
conditions presented in the proposition. Apart from the policy where the principal
monitors the investment and the shock, each monitoring regime is optimal for some
values of the monitoring costs Ci and Cs.
The principal optimally monitors either the investment or the shock as long as
monitoring costs are low enough. On one hand, this result builds on Proposition 2.1:
if the principal can control the investment decision through monitoring, there is no
additional gain from observing the shock. On the other hand, the result is implied
by the fact that the principal achieves a strictly higher payoff under monitoring
of the shock than without monitoring. If the principal does not monitor then she
has to give a positive rent to the agent for private information of the cost shock.
Without monitoring, the best deviation of the agent with low investment cost is to
select the contract for non-investing agents, make the investment, and falsely report
the cost shock. As Lemma 2.2 shows, the agent’s false report is strict due to the
fact that the investment on the deviation path is strictly different from zero. The
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agent can therefore secure a positive information rent for the private knowledge he
acquires after signing a contract. In the discussion section, I relate this result to
the insights on post-contractual information rents from the literature on dynamic
mechanism design.
The next result shows that both monitoring technologies can be perfect substi-
tutes. This is the case if moral hazard is irrelevant. In contrast, if moral hazard is
relevant, then monitoring of the investment is the more effective instrument.
Proposition 2.7. If moral hazard is irrelevant, both monitoring technologies give
the same payoff gross monitoring costs. If moral hazard is relevant, the payoff gross
monitoring costs is higher under investment monitoring; i.e., if equation (2.5) is
satisfied, then Πi = Πs, otherwise Πi > Πs.
Without monitoring, the agent’s optimal deviation exploits moral hazard re-
garding the investment and private information about the shock. The principal
can directly eliminate moral hazard by monitoring the investment decision. As
argued above, this also resolves the problem of private information. If moral haz-
ard is irrelevant under shock monitoring then the principal can also eliminate both
sources of agency cost by observing the shock. If moral hazard is irrelevant, then
the agent’s best deviation under shock monitoring does not make use of a deviation
in the investment decision. In this case, both monitoring technologies are equally
effective. The principal then simply chooses the monitoring technology with lower
monitoring costs. If moral hazard is relevant, then monitoring the shock is not
enough to eliminate the agency costs resulting from moral hazard regarding the
investment. In this case, shock monitoring the shock is not as effective as invest-
ment monitoring. With shock monitoring, the agent’s best deviation is to pick the
contract for non-investing agents even if investment costs are low, and to make
the investment nevertheless. Thus, the principal only monitors the shock if this is
sufficiently cheaper than investment monitoring.
Figure 2.4 illustrates the optimal monitoring policy for the case where moral
hazard is relevant and for the case where it is not.
Relevance of moral hazard
Moral hazard is relevant if the inequality (2.5) is satisfied. This condition is not
formulated in terms of the fundamentals of the model. The condition can be
satisfied under assumptions on the production cost functions c0(·) and c1(·) or
the distribution function F . Here, I want to provide one such condition on the
distribution function. Let {Fz(κ)}z∈(z,z) be a family of distribution functions of
the investment cost which satisfies Fz(κ) = F (κ− z) for all κ and z. Furthermore,
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Figure 2.4: Optimal monitoring policy
Ci
Cs
















Moral hazard is irrelevant
Ci = Cs
The figure depicts the optimal monitoring policy depending on the costs of monitoring Ci and Cs
for the cases where moral hazard is relevant and where it is irrelevant.
Fz(κ
∗) = 1 and Fz(κ
∗) = 0. These distribution functions are therefore generated
by moving the support of distribution F . A higher z corresponds to a higher level
of investment cost. I can then show the following result.
Proposition 2.8. If the level of investment costs is high then moral hazard is
irrelevant under monitoring of the shock, i.e., ∃z′ ∈ [z, z), such that inequality
(2.5) is satisfied if z ≥ z′.
If the level of investment costs is high, then the probability that the agent will
invest is small. The principal has to give an information rent to the agent only
in this case. As the probability to pay this rent is small, the principal optimally
induces a minor distortion in the investment decision. If this distortion is small,
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the information rent of investing agents is large. Thus, all deviations for which the
agent selects the contract for non-investing agents become relatively less attractive.
If the level of investment costs is large enough, moral hazard therefore becomes
irrelevant.
Monitoring and efficiency
Monitoring often has ambiguous effects on efficiency. If the principal moves from
no monitoring to investment monitoring, production efficiency increases whereas
investment efficiency decreases. The optimal contracts under monitoring of invest-
ment and monitoring the shock lead either to identical investment and production
decisions or imply lower investment efficiency and higher production efficiency un-
der monitoring of investment.
However, shock monitoring can have unambiguously negative effects on effi-
ciency.
Proposition 2.9. If the principal’s value for the good is high, then investment and
production are more efficient without monitoring than with monitoring the shock:
There exists v̂ ∈ (c, c) such that εs0 < εn0 and κs < κn for v > v̂.
Perhaps surprisingly, private learning of the shock increases total efficiency if
the value of the good is high. Privacy of post-contractual information may therefore
increase the efficiency in optimal contracts.
In optimal contracts without monitoring and with shock monitoring, the prin-
cipal reduces the information rent of the investing agent by trading less frequently
with the non-investing agent. The effect of a small reduction in the probability of
production on the information rent differs between the two cases. Proposition 2.9
follows from the fact that the marginal effect on rents is smaller without monitoring
for high realizations of the shock. This is illustrated in Figure 2.5: When the pro-
duction threshold for the non-investing agent is reduced from the efficient level ε∗0
to the smaller level ε0 then the agent’s rent decreases from A to A
′ under monitor-
ing of the shock. If the principal does not monitor, the rent decreases from A+B
to A′+B′. Note that for high values of v, B′ is larger than B. The reduction of the
production threshold is therefore less effective in reducing information rents with-
out monitoring than with shock monitoring. Thus, the principal finds it optimal
to induce a smaller production distortion without monitoring. The agent therefore
receives a higher total value of information rent without monitoring, which implies
a higher investment threshold. It follows that the optimal contract is more efficient
without monitoring.
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The upper part of the figure is equivalent to Figure 2.1 for the case where v is high. The lower part
shows the effect of a reduction of the cutoff from ε∗0 to ε0. With shock monitoring this reduces
the agent’s information rent from A to A′. Without monitoring it reduces the rent from A+B to
A′ +B′. As B′ is larger than B, the reduction in rent is larger with shock monitoring.
2.7 Discussion
Relevance of private post-contractual information
In the literature on dynamic mechanism design, a central question concerns the rel-
evance of the privacy of post-contractual information. Baron and Besanko (1984),
Eső and Szentes (2007a,b) and Pavan et al. (2014) show that in many setups of
dynamic adverse selection, the principal can costlessly elicit private information
which the agent learns after contracting. Baron and Besanko (1984) and Eső and
Szentes (2015) argue that this insight also holds in models of dynamic adverse
selection and moral hazard.
CHAPTER 2. OPTIMAL MONITORING IN PROCUREMENT 73
In contrast, Krähmer and Strausz (2015) show in a model of pure adverse selec-
tion, that the privacy of post-contractual information matters if the agent’s private
information learned before contracting (ex-ante type) is drawn from a discrete set.
In this chapter, privacy of post-contractual information turns out to be relevant
in a model of dynamic adverse selection and moral hazard. Whereas the agent’s
private information, i.e., the investment cost and the cost shock, are drawn from
continuous distributions, the agent chooses an unobservable action from a discrete
set. As in Krähmer and Strausz (2015), the agent’s best deviation strategy under
no monitoring includes a strict lie about post-contractual information. As such a
deviation is not feasible if post-contractual information is publicly observed, pri-
vacy of post-contractual information is relevant. However, there are a two notable
differences to the result in Krähmer and Strausz (2015). First, the envelope theo-
rem13 can be applied in the setup of the current chapter in order to determine the
agent’s expected utility as a function of his ex-ante type. This is not feasible in
Krähmer and Strausz (2015) due to the discreteness of the agent’s ex-ante type.
Second, Krähmer and Strausz (2015) show that the principal’s optimal allocation
under observable post-contractual information can still be implemented if ex-post
information is unobservable, though at a lower revenue. In this chapter, I show in
Proposition 2.4, that the optimal allocation with shock monitoring – consisting of
the investment and production decisions – cannot be implemented without moni-
toring. Privacy of post-contractual information restricts the set of implementable
allocations for the principal, but does not change the principal’s ability to extract
surplus from a given allocation, as in Krähmer and Strausz (2015). This also ex-
plains the relation to Eső and Szentes (2015). They study a general model of
dynamic adverse selection and moral hazard. They show that the principal can
achieve the same revenue under public and private post-contractual information,
as long as the optimal allocation and the optimal actions under public informa-
tion remain implementable with private information. In the model of the current
chapter, the principal cannot implement the optimal production and investment
decisions with shock monitoring if she does not monitor (Proposition 2.4). The
precondition of the result by Eső and Szentes (2015) is therefore not satisfied in
this model.
Binary investment decision and fixed costs of investment
All results were presented using a simple model with a binary investment decision.
A binary investment decision reflects non-convexities in the investment decision. In
practice, many investment decisions are non-convex. If the investment represents
13Theorem 2 in Milgrom and Segal (2002)
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the adoption of a new technology, the supplier is likely to face fixed costs of learning
the new technology. Astebro (2004) empirically documents such fixed costs of
learning. More generally, lumpy investment behavior is often attributed to fixed
costs of investment and such non-convex investment behavior is widely observed
among firms.14
2.8 Conclusion
What kind of information should government institutions monitor in order to man-
age public contracts efficiently? This chapter provides an analysis of this question
in a principal-agent model where the principal can decide whether to monitor an
agent’s investment in cost reduction or a shock to production costs that the agent
learns after contracting. I show that the principal optimally monitors either the
investment decision or the cost shock. Under investment monitoring, the principal
achieves at least the same payoff – gross monitoring costs – as under shock moni-
toring. However, moral hazard may be irrelevant under shock monitoring. In this
case, both monitoring technologies are equally effective.
The results suggest that government institutions should monitor endogenous
cost factors (such as investments) rather than exogenous cost factors (such as cost
shocks) if the costs of monitoring are similar across outcomes. However, if ex-
ogenous cost factors are cheaper to monitor then doing so can give a government
institution the same control over private suppliers at lower costs.
14 Doms and Dunne (1998) provide empirical evidence and Caplin and Leahy (2010) survey the
history of applications of the (S, s)-model, an investment model with fixed costs.
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2.9 Appendix to Chapter 2
Proof of Proposition 2.1 The proof follows from the discussion in the main
text.
Proof of Lemma 2.1 Condition 1 is equivalent to (2.3) for x = 1, x′ = x′′ = 0,
and for x = 0, x′ = x′′ = 1. Condition 2 is equivalent to (2.3) for x = x′ = x′′ = 0.
Conditions 3 and 4 are implied by condition 1, (2.3) for x = x′′ = 1, x′ = 0, and
(2.3) for x = x′′ = 0, x′ = 1. Conversely, conditions 1, 3, and 4 imply (2.3) for
x = x′′ = 1, x′ = 0, and for x = x′′ = 0, x′ = 1. Conditions 1 and 2 imply (2.3)
for x = x′ = x′′ = 1. It remains to prove that conditions 1 to 4 imply (2.3) for
x = x′ = 1, x′′ = 0, and for x = x′ = 0, x′′ = 1. The first constraint can be
rewritten as ∫ 1
0
(c0(ε)− c1(ε))q1(ε)dε ≥ κ
for κ ∈ K1. By condition 1, κ ≤ κ̂ for κ ∈ K1, and the constraint is implied by
condition 4. The second constraint can be written as∫ 1
0
(c0(ε)− c1(ε))q0(ε)dε ≤ κ
for κ ∈ K0. By condition 1, κ ≥ κ̂ for κ ∈ K0. The constraint is therefore implied
by condition 3.
Proof of Proposition 2.2 Plug κ̂ = κi and efficient production rules in condi-


















Condition 3 is therefore satisfied if the condition in the lemma is satisfied. The left-




which is greater than κ∗. Condition 4 is therefore always satisfied. Note that
conditions 3 and 4 do not restrict the choice of U0 and U1. One can therefore set
U0 and U1 as in the optimal contract under monitoring of the investment, so that
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expected transfers are identical in both cases.
Proof of Proposition 2.3 If moral hazard is irrelevant, the result is immedi-
ate. Suppose moral hazard is relevant and consider the principal’s problem (2.4).
Neglect condition 4 of Lemma 2.1. It is optimal to set U0 = 0 and q1(·) = q∗1(·).
I now show that the optimal threshold κs satisfies κs ∈ (κi, κ∗). Suppose
κs ≤ κi. As moral hazard is relevant, q0(·) = q∗0(·) is not feasible. It follows that
the marginal gain of an additionally investing agent type exceeds the marginal
information rent: G(q∗1, q0, κ
s) − F (κs)/f(κs) > G(q∗1, q∗0, κi) − F (κi)/f(κi) = 0.
It is therefore profitable to increase κs which also relaxes condition 3. It follows
that κs > κi. Suppose next κs ≥ κ∗. The proof of Proposition 2.2 implies that
q0(·) = q∗0(·) is feasible. The marginal gain of an additionally investing agent




κ∗−κs−F (κs)/f(κs) ≤ −F (κs)/f(κs) < 0. Decreasing κs is profitable. It follows
κs < κ∗.
Furthermore, note that G(q∗1, q0, κ
s) < F (κs)/f(κs) in any optimum. If this
does not hold it is always profitable to increase κs and set q0 closer to q
∗
0.
Moreover, condition 3 of Lemma 2.1 is satisfied with equality at the optimum.
If condition 3 is satisfied with strict inequality, it is possible to set q0(·) closer to
q∗0(·) and increase the payoff.
One can therefore write the threshold κ̂ as a function of qs0(·). Plugging this
















For any fixed threshold κ̂ that satisfies κ̂ ∈ (κi, κ∗) and G(q∗1, q0, κ̂) < F (κ̂)/f(κ̂),
this expression is decreasing in ε under Assumption 2.1. If us1(ε) is increasing, this
follows from G(q∗1, q0, κ̂) < F (κ̂)/f(κ̂). If u
s
1(ε) is decreasing, it follows from As-
sumption 2.1 as F (κ∗)/(1−F (κ∗) > F (κ̂)/(1−F (κ̂)−f(κ̂)/(1−F (κ̂)) ·G(q∗1, q0, κ̂).
Thus, the threshold κ̂ is optimally implemented by a step function q0(ε) = 1(ε ≤
ε0). Since κ
s satisfies κs ∈ (κi, κ∗) and G(q∗1, q0, κs) < F (κs)/f(κs), there exists a
cutoff εs0 which optimally implements κ
s and this implies (2.8). There is a unique
combination of κs and εs0 which equates the first-order derivative to zero and sat-
isfies (2.9). This follows from κs being increasing in εs0, (1 − F (κ̂))/f(κ̂) being
increasing in κs, and G(q∗1, q
s
0, κ
s)− F (κs)/f(κs) being increasing in εs0 and κs, for
qs0(ε) = 1(ε ≤ εs0).
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0 ≥ ε∗0, there is no first-order loss from
decreasing εs0 whereas there is a first-order gain from a lower fraction of investing
agent types as F (κs)/f(κs) − G(q∗1, qs0, κs) > 0. Finally, one can easily check that
condition 4 of Lemma 2.1 is satisfied as κs < κ∗. Optimal transfers can be derived
from the definitions of U1 and U0.
Proof of Lemma 2.2 For ε̃(ε) = c−1x (cx′(ε)), (2.10) implies
tx(ε
′)− cx′(ε)qx(ε′) = tx(ε′)− cx(c−1x (cx′(ε)))qx(ε′)
≤ tx(c−1x (cx′(ε)))− cx(c−1x (cx′(ε)))qx(c−1x (cx′(ε)))
= tx(ε̃(ε))− cx′(ε)qx(ε̃(ε))
Proof of Lemma 2.3 By standard mechanism design arguments, one can show
that condition 5 of the lemma is sufficient and necessary for (2.10). (2.11) can be
rewritten as follows. The left-hand side equals Ux − κx. Using Lemma 2.2 and
condition 5 one can rewrite the right-hand side as follows (where I use the notation





















































x′′ (cx′(ε))− ε)dε− κx
′′.
where the first inequality follows from Lemma 2.2, the second from condition 5,
the fourth from integration by parts, and the fifth from a change of variable from
ε to ε̃. Under condition 5, (2.11) is therefore equivalent to







x′′ (cx′(ε))− ε)dε− κx
′′, 0
}
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for κ ∈ Kx and x, x′, x′′ ∈ {0, 1}. The equivalence of this condition to the conditions
1 to 4 of the lemma can be shown by taking exactly the same steps as in the proof
of Lemma 2.1.
Proof of Proposition 2.4 Plug q∗x(ε) into the left-hand sides of conditions 3
and 4 of Lemma 2.3.∫ ε∗x
0


























where the second equality follows from a change of variable and the third equality
follows from integration by parts. κ∗ is therefore the only threshold that is incentive
compatible and individual rational under efficient production.
In order to prove the second part of the lemma I show that conditions 3 and 4
in Lemma 2.1 are less restrictive than conditions 3 and 4 in Lemma 2.3. In order



































(cx(ε)− cx′(ε))qx(ε)dε for x = 0, x′ = 1 (x = 1, x′ = 0)
where the last inequality holds if qx(ε) is not constant on [0, 1]. This is the case for
qs0 and q
s




the stricter condition 3 of Lemma 2.3 cannot be satisfied for qs0 and κ
s.
Proof of Proposition 2.5 The proof is only sketched as it essentially follows
the same steps as the proof of Proposition 2.3. Consider the principal’s problem
defined in (2.12) and neglect conditions 4 and 5. It is optimal to set U0 = 0
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and q1(·) = q∗1(·). Using the same arguments as in the proof of Proposition 2.3,
it can be shown that the optimal investment threshold κa satisfies κa ∈ (κi, κ∗),
G(q∗1, q0, κ
a) < F (κa)/f(κa), and that condition 3 is satisfied with equality. The
last result allows to derive a first-order condition analogous to (2.17) with ua1(ε)
instead of us1(ε). By the same arguments as in the proof of Proposition 2.3, it can
be derived that there is a unique optimal pair κa and εa0 with q
a
0(ε) = 1(ε ≤ εa0)




0(ε) is decreasing in ε,
transfers can be chosen to satisfy the requirement of condition 5, and it can be
shown that condition 4 is satisfied.
Proof of Proposition 2.6 By Proposition 2.1, it is never optimal to monitor
the shock and the investment as this would give the payoff Πi which can also be
achieved if only investment is monitored. The conditions for optimality are derived
from the payoffs Πi −Ci, Πs −Cs, and Πn that can be achieved under monitoring
of investment, the shock, and no monitoring. From Proposition 2.3 it follows that
Πi ≥ Πn. If Πs > Πn, there exist Ci > 0 and Cs > 0 such that any of the three
monitoring choices can be optimal. Πs > Πn follows from the fact that condition 3
of Lemma 2.3 is more restrictive than condition 3 of Lemma 2.1, which is implied
by (2.18).
Proof of Proposition 2.7 The proof follows from the discussion in the main
text.
Proof of Proposition 2.8 By Proposition 2.3, Πi = Πs if moral hazard is
irrelevant and Πi > Πs is moral hazard is relevant. It only remains to show that
there exists a z′ ∈ [z, z) such that moral hazard is relevant (i.e., (2.5) is satisfied)








From the definition of Fz it follows that Fz(κ)/fz(κ) = F (κ − z)/f(κ − z). By
log-concavity of f , Fz(κ)/fz(κ) is increasing in κ and decreasing in z. This proves




∗) = 0. As κ∗ −κiz is therefore
decreasing in z and zero at z, this establishes the existence of z′.
Proof of Proposition 2.9 For v = c, (2.9) and (2.15) are solved by εs0 = ε
n
0 = 1.
As us1(1) = u
n
1 (1) = 0, there is by (2.8) and (2.14) no first-order effect on κ
s
and κn for v smaller but close to c. However, us1(ε) > u
n
1 (ε) for ε close to one.
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This is implied by the following argument: Note that us1(1) = u
n
1 (1) = 0 and
∂us1(ε)/∂ε = c
′
0(ε)− c′1(ε). For ε close to one, the following approximation holds




















as c−11 (c0(ε)) ≃ ε for ε close to one. It follows for ε close to one





















(c′0(ε)− c′1(ε))2 > 0
It follows by continuity that us1(ε) > u
n
1 (ε) for ε close to one. This implies
1− F (κn)
f(κn)






≃ 1− F (κ
s)
f(κs)
















Thus, εn0 > ε
s
0 and κ





with Asymmetric Agency Costs
This chapter is based on Asseyer (2016c).
3.1 Introduction
Competition authorities in both the United States and the European Union con-
sider discriminatory pricing policies a potential abuse of a dominant market posi-
tion.1 On this basis, a monopolistic upstream firm can be restrained from offer-
ing different tariffs to different downstream firms. The extant literature on price
discrimination in intermediate good markets analyzes the welfare implications of
banning price discrimination (Katz, 1987; DeGraba, 1990; Yoshida, 2000; Inderst
and Shaffer, 2009; Inderst and Valletti, 2009; Herweg and Müller, 2014). This lit-
erature mainly focusses on the case where downstream firms differ with respect to
their costs. Thereby, it is implicitly assumed that differences in costs reflect solely
differences in the social costs of production, i.e., the opportunity costs for labor
and other inputs into the production process. I refer to these costs as production
costs. However, the costs of a firm are also determined by agency costs that arise
if different stakeholders of a firm have conflicting interests.
In many industries, different firms have different forms of vertical organization.
The coexistence of vertically integrated and vertically separated firms in the same
industry is documented for the US petroleum refining industry (Bindemann, 1999),
1The Patman-Robinson Act regulates price discrimination in the United States. In the EU,
Article 82c) of the CE treaty restricts the use of price discrimination.
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the UK package holiday industry (Buehler and Schmutzler, 2005), the beer industry
in the UK (Slade, 1998a), gasoline retailing in Canada (Slade, 1998b), the US cable
television industry (Waterman and Weiss, 1996; Chipty, 2001), and the Mexican
footwear industry (Woodruff, 2002).2 With vertical separation, different vertically
related firms need to bargain over production and pricing decisions. The examples
above therefore suggest that agency costs are often asymmetric among different
downstream firms in intermediate good markets. In these industries, upstream
firms may therefore wish to charge downstream firms different prices depending on
whether they are vertically integrated or vertically separated.
It therefore arises the question how price discrimination affects the total welfare
on a market if cost differences are implied by agency problems, and whether the
source of cost differences matters for the welfare implications of discriminatory
pricing policies.
In order to study this question, I analyze a model of an intermediate good
market where a monopolistic upstream firm sells an intermediate good to two
downstream firms that serve independent and identical consumer markets. The
upstream firm can offer the downstream firms arbitrary tariffs that determine how
much the downstream firms have to pay for a given quantity.3 In a first step, I study
a model where downstream firms have different agency costs due to asymmetric
degrees of vertical integration. One downstream firm is vertically integrated and
produces the final good itself. The other downstream firm is vertically separated
and delegates production to a subcontractor. The integrated downstream firm and
the subcontractor have private information about their production costs. Due to
the informational advantage of the subcontractor, the separated downstream firm
has to give an information rent to its subcontractor. This rent is an agency cost
which leads to a cost disadvantage for the vertically separated downstream firm.
I show that it is optimal for the upstream firm to discriminate between the
downstream firms by favoring the vertically separated downstream firm. As the
vertically separated downstream firm is weaker and reacts more sensitively to a
price increase, the upstream firm offers the vertically separated firm a lower tariff.
Furthermore, I demonstrate that price discrimination increases total welfare
under mild conditions. Due to asymmetric agency costs, the vertically integrated
downstream firm produces more of the final good than the vertically separated
firm even if it has the same cost function as the subcontractor. With price dis-
2These examples are taken from Buehler and Schmutzler (2005).
3Throughout the chapter, price discrimination refers to third degree price discrimination, i.e.,
a situation where the upstream firm offers the downstream firm different tariffs. This approach is
in line with the regulatory policy of the EU that does not consider quantity discounts as an abuse
of a dominant market position, c.f. (Herweg and Müller, 2012).
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crimination, the separated firm faces a lower tariff than the integrated firm. This
partially offsets the cost disadvantage of vertical separation. If price discrimination
is banned, both downstream firms receive the same tariff that improves the terms
of trade of the integrated firm and deteriorates the terms for the separated firm.
Consequently, the separated downstream firm reduces its production whereas the
vertically integrated firm extends its production. A ban on price discrimination
therefore increases the difference in production between the firms even if they have
the same production costs. Under mild conditions that are satisfied for the case of
linear demand and cost functions, a ban on price discrimination reduces the total
production of the downstream firms with identical cost functions. Together with
the marginal effect described above, this implies that price discrimination increases
total welfare.
In a next step, I compare this result to the welfare effects of price discrimina-
tion when downstream firms have different production costs. I consider a model as
in Herweg and Müller (2014) where both downstream firms produce a final good
and have private information about their production costs. One downstream firm
uses a production technology which is less efficient than the production technol-
ogy of the other downstream firm. In particular, I consider the case where the
cost disadvantage due to the different technology is exactly equivalent to the cost
disadvantage due to vertical separation in the first model.
From a positive perspective, cost differences between downstream firms lead to
the same market outcomes independently of whether they are caused by agency or
production costs. The incentives are independent of the source of the cost differ-
ence. However, the source of cost differences matters from a welfare perspective.
Agency costs arise if stakeholders within a firm or a vertical relationship can secure
rents for themselves. Rent payments constitute a cost from the perspective of the
firm. From a welfare perspective, rent payments have only a redistributive effect.
In contrast, production cost have a direct impact on total welfare.
I show that price discrimination has always a more positive effect on welfare in
the model with asymmetric agency costs. In the model with asymmetric produc-
tion costs, price discrimination implies that the downstream firms produce different
quantities of the final good even if they have the same social costs of production.
Under a ban on price discrimination, both downstream firms produce the same
quantity if they have the same production costs. Thus, a ban on price discrimina-
tion reduces the difference in production between the downstream firms.
If both final good markets are covered, the same conditions as before imply
that price discrimination reduces the total production of the downstream firms
with identical cost functions. Together with the marginal effect described before,
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this implies that price discrimination reduces welfare in the model with asymmetric
production costs.
Related literature There is a long-standing interest in the welfare effects of
price discrimination. Robinson (1933) provides the first formal analysis of the
welfare effects of price discrimination in final good markets. Aguirre et al. (2010)
and Cowan (2012) extend and generalize her insights to more general demand
functions.
The literature on price discrimination in intermediate good markets starts with
Katz (1987) who shows that price discrimination can be detrimental for welfare
if larger downstream firms have the possibility to engage in inefficient backward
integration by producing an input instead of buying it. In a model with linear
demand curves, DeGraba (1990) shows that price discrimination reduces welfare
in the short and in the long run. Yoshida (2000) analyzes a model with linear
production technologies and shows that price discrimination often reduces welfare.
Inderst and Valletti (2009) analyze the short and long run welfare effects of price
discrimination when downstream firms have the opportunity to change their sup-
plier. They show that price discrimination reduces consumer surplus in the short
run but can increase consumer surplus in the long run. Arya and Mittendorf (2010)
demonstrate that price discrimination can increase social welfare in a model where
downstream firms serve several final good markets and lower demand markets are
less competitive.
In contrast to the previous papers, and as in the current chapter, O’Brien and
Shaffer (1994), Inderst and Shaffer (2009), and Herweg and Müller (2014) analyze
the case where the upstream firm sets non-linear tariffs. O’Brien and Shaffer (1994)
and Inderst and Shaffer (2009) analyze settings under complete information where
the upstream firm offers two-part tariffs to the downstream firms. Both papers show
that price discrimination is usually welfare increasing. Herweg and Müller (2014)
is the closest to the current chapter. They analyze a model where an upstream
firm sells an input to two downstream firms which have private information about
their production costs. The upstream firm offers the optimal screening contracts
to the downstream firms. Herweg and Müller show that price discrimination is
welfare-reducing as long as markets are covered under uniform pricing. The model
with asymmetric production costs studied in the current chapter is a version of
their model.
As most of the literature, the current chapter takes the industry structure as
given. Herweg and Müller (2012) analyze the welfare effects of price discrimination
if new buyers can enter the market. Again following most of the papers in the
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literature, the seller has all bargaining power in the current chapter. O’Brien
(2014) allows for more general forms of bargaining between buyers and sellers.
In the next section, I present the model with asymmetric agency costs. For this
model, section 3.3 provides the equilibrium analysis when price discrimination is
permitted. In Section 3.4, the welfare effects of price discrimination are analyzed
under asymmetric agency costs. Section 3.5 presents a comparison to the welfare
result under asymmetric production technologies. Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 A model with asymmetric agency costs
An upstream firm U produces an intermediate good at zero marginal cost for two
downstream firms which serve two independent markets. The first downstream
firm D1 serves market 1 and the second downstream firm D2 serves market 2. The
inverse demand function is identical on both markets and given by P (qi) where qi
is the quantity which is sold on market i. The inverse demand function P (qi) is
strictly decreasing in the quantity qi.
D1 can produce the final good with a one-to-one technology which transforms q1
units of the intermediate good into q1 units of the final good at a cost c1k(q1). The
variable c1 is a parameter of the cost function which is private information to D1.
The cost parameter c1 is drawn according to the cumulative distribution function
F (c1) from the interval [c,∞) ⊂ R+. F (·) has a twice differentiable density f(·).
D2 buys the input from U and delegates production to a subcontractor S. Using
a one-to-one production technology, S produces the quantity q2 of the final good at
production cost c2k(q2) where the cost parameter c2 is private information to S and
drawn from the interval [c,∞) according to the cumulative distribution function
F (c2).
I refer toD1 as the vertically integrated downstream firm and toD2 and S as the
vertically separated downstream firm. The structure of the industry is illustrated
in Figure 3.1.
Profit Functions If the transfer ti is paid from Di to U with i ∈ {1, 2}, ts is a
payment from S to D2, and qi is the quantity sold on market i, U makes a profit
of t1 + t2, D1’s profit is q1P (q1)− c1k(q1)− t1, D2 receives a profit of ts − t2, and
S makes a profit of q2P (q2) − c2k(q2) − ts. These definitions implicitly assume
that S sells the final good on market 2. Since I do not restrict the set of possible
subcontracts between D2 and S, and since quantities are contractible, this setting
is equivalent to the case where D2 delegates production to S but serves the market
2 itself.
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Market 1 Market 2
Vertical Integration Vertical Separation
The upstream firm U sells an input to the vertically integrated downstream firm D1 and the
vertically separated downstream D2 that delegates production to the subcontractor S. D1 and
D2 serve independent markets.
The contracting game I study the following contracting game between U , D1,
D2, and S. At the beginning of the game, the cost parameters c1 and c2 are drawn.
The parameter c1 is only observed by D1 and c2 is only observed by S. Next, U
offers a tariff T1(q1) to D1 and a tariff T2(q2) to D2. These tariffs imply that Di can
order a quantity qi of the intermediate good at a total payment of Ti(qi). Then,
D2 offers a tariff Ts(q2) to S. With this tariff, D2 commits to deliver a quantity q2
of the intermediate good at a payment Ts(q2). S can accept or reject this offer. If
S accepts and orders a positive quantity q2, D2 is committed to accept the tariff
T2(q2). After S has made the participation decision, D1 chooses whether to accept
or reject T1(q1). Finally, production takes place and payoffs realize. I impose no
restrictions, such as linearity, on the tariffs T1(q1), T2(q2), and Ts(q2).
I analyze U ’s most preferred Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of this game. I make
the following assumptions about the demand and cost functions.
Assumption 3.1. The inverse demand function P (q) and the cost function k(q)
satisfy the following conditions:
1. R(q) ≡ qP (q) is strictly concave with finite maximizer;
2. k(0) = 0, k′(q) > 0 if q > 0, k′′(q) ≥ 0;
3. R′(0)− ck′(0) > 0.
Parts 1 and 2 assume that revenue is concave and that the cost function is
increasing and weakly convex. Condition 3 ensures that production is profitable if
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the cost parameter is sufficiently low.
An important role is played by the virtual cost parameter h(ci) which is defined
as




Note that h(ci) is distributed on [c,∞) according to the cumulative distribution
function G(c) ≡ Pr(h(ci) ≤ c) = F (h−1(c)) with the density g(c) = G′(c). I make
the following assumption:
Assumption 3.2. The distribution function F (·) satisfies the following conditions:
1. h(c) is strictly increasing and convex;
2. g(c)/f(c) is weakly increasing;
3. c+ F (c)+G(c)f(c)+g(c) is weakly increasing.
Assumption 3.2 is satisfied for a large class of standard distribution functions
such as the normal, logistic, beta, gamma, Gumbel, Fréchet, Weibull, chi squared,
and chi distributions. The first part of the assumption states that the virtual
cost parameter be increasing and convex. Note that this is satisfied if the inverse
hazard rate F (c)/f(c) is increasing and convex. This assumption corresponds to
conditions on pass-through rates of demand functions when demand is interpreted
as a distribution function in the tradition of Bulow and Pfleiderer (1983). An
increasing hazard rate is equivalent to a pass-through rate greater than one, and
a convex hazard rate is equivalent to an increasing pass-through rate. Weyl and
Fabinger (2009) show that these two assumptions are satisfied for a large class of
standard distribution functions. The second part of the assumption states that the
distribution of the virtual cost parameter dominates the distribution of the real cost
parameter in the likelihood ratio order. For the last part of the assumption, note
that the inverse hazard rate of virtual cost parameter, G(c)/g(c) is increasing, if the
inverse hazard rate of the real cost parameter F (c)/f(c) is increasing and convex.
The assumption is therefore satisfied if also the linear combination α(c)F (c)/f(c)+
(1− α(c))G(c)/g(c) with α(c) = f(c)/(f(c) + g(c)) is increasing.4
Assumptions 3.1 and 3.2 are maintained throughout the chapter.
4 The distribution function F (c) = e−1/a(c−b)
2
on [b,∞) is an example for which it can be
easily checked that Assumption 3.2 is satisfied. Note that this distribution is a special case of a
Fréchet distribution. I present the calculations in the Appendix.
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Industry optimum If there is no conflict of interest within the industry, the four
players maximize the total industry profit. For the production cost parameters c1




Assumption 3.1 implies that there is a pair of unique and finite quantities
(q∗1(c1), q
∗






Public information Private information is an essential ingredient of the model.
With public information, the difference in the vertical organization of the down-
stream firms is irrelevant because the seller can charge nonlinear tariffs. To see
this, suppose that the cost parameters c1 and c2 are public information. In this
case, U can extract the whole industry profit. U optimally offers D1 and D2 the
two-part-tariffs (w,Φ) where the piece-rate w equals U ’s marginal cost of zero and
the fixed payment Φ is set to extract the whole profit, i.e.
Φ = R(q∗(ci))− cik(q∗(ci)).
D1 cannot do better than to accept the tariff and to choose the quantity q1(c1) =
q∗(c1). For D2 it is optimal to pass on the contractual terms to S. S is then in the
same situation as D1 and produces the quantity q2(c2) = q
∗(c2). U discriminates
between D1 and D2 only on the basis of their realized cost parameters, not on
the basis of their organizational form.5 The analysis in this chapter shows that
asymmetric information about cost parameters renders discrimination on the basis
of the organizational form profitable. This holds even if the upstream firm can
offer arbitrary tariffs.
Price discrimination Due to the presence of private information, U may choose
tariffs which reflect two different forms of price discrimination. First, U may wish
to offer D1 and D2 different contracts based on the observable difference in their
vertical organization. This would be an instance of third degree price discrimina-
tion. Second, U may find it optimal to offer nonlinear contracts to the downstream
firms in order to screen their private information in the most profitable way, i.e.
to engage in second degree price discrimination. Here, I follow the literature on
price discrimination with nonlinear tariffs (Inderst and Shaffer, 2009; Herweg and
Müller, 2014) and focus on third degree price discrimination and its welfare effects.
5The analysis of this model under public information is a special case in Inderst and Shaffer
(2009) who analyze price discrimination under symmetric information with two part tariffs.
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In the following, the term price discrimination always refers to third degree price
discrimination.
Definition 2. U price discriminates between D1 and D2 if and only if T1(q) ̸=
T2(q) for some quantity q. U favors Di if Ti(q) ≤ Tj(q) for all quantities q and
Ti(q) < Tj(q) for some quantity q, with i, j ∈ {1, 2} and i ̸= j.
I analyze the normative question whether an upstream firm with market power
should be allowed to discriminate among his customers when nonlinear tariffs can
be used.
3.3 Optimal tariffs
In this section, I provide the equilibrium analysis of the game when price discrim-
ination is allowed and when it is banned.
Optimal tariffs under price discrimination
I analyze the optimal wholesale tariffs that U offers to the downstream firms D1
and D2 when U can discriminate between the downstream firms. In the vertical
chain serving market 2, a double marginalization problem arises: D2 has to give
an information rent to S for information about production costs, and U has to
give an information rent to D2 for the private knowledge which D2 gains through
communication with S. If the cost parameters c1 and c2 are the same, the costs of
D1 are lower than the costs of D2 as D1 does not have to pay an information rent.
I show that U discriminates between D1 and D2 by favoring the vertically
separated firm D2 if the virtual cost parameter h(·) is strictly convex. If h(·)
is linear, U offers the downstream firms the same tariff. The curvature of h(·)
measures how strongly D2 increases the tariff for S if U increases the tariff for D2.
If h(·) is linear, increasing prices for D1 and D2 reduces the induced demand from
markets 1 and 2 in the same proportion. Thus, the price elasticities of the induced
demand functions are the same. However, if h(·) is strictly convex, then an increase
in the tariff for D2 induces D2 to strongly increase the tariff for S. This strongly
reduces the demand from market 2. This implies that it is optimal for U to give
D2 a more attractive tariff than D1.
I now analyze the tariffs that U optimally offers to the two downstream firms.
As the two markets are independent, the optimal design of the tariff for D1 is
independent of the tariff for D2 and vice versa. I can thus analyze the two problems
separately.
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Optimal wholesale tariff for D1 U chooses the tariff T1(q1) in order to maxi-
mize its expected profit. The optimal tariff needs to satisfy the incentive constraint
that D1 orders its preferred quantity for any value of the cost parameter, and the
participation constraint that D1 accepts the tariff T1(q1). U ’s optimal tariff is





s.t. q1(c1) ∈ argmax
q
R(q)− c1k(q)− T1(q), (IC1)
max
q
R(q)− c1k(q)− T1(q) ≥ 0 for all c1 ∈ [c,∞). (PC1)
This problem can be solved using standard techniques as provided in a clear expo-
sition by Martimort and Stole (2009). The solution to this problem is presented in
the following Lemma.
Lemma 3.1. If price discrimination is permitted, U offers the tariff T d1 (q1) to D1,




1 (q1) and q
d
1(c1) are given by










(·) is the inverse of qd1(c1) with
(qd1)
−1
(0) = c1 ≡ min
{
c ∈ [c,∞) : qd1(c) = 0
}
.
U optimally screens the private information of D1 by offering a tariff for which
D1 orders a quantity that maximizes the virtual industry profit on market 1. This
is reflected by the definition of the quantity qd1(c1) in equation (3.2). The optimal
tariff T1(·) is the tariff which induces D1 to choose this quantity.
Optimal wholesale tariff for D2 I now turn to the analysis of the tariff which
U optimally offers to D2. For a given tariff T2(q2), D2 offers a tariff Ts(q2) to S.
The optimal offer of U to D2 depends on the tariff which D2 offers to S in response.
The game can be solved backwards. I first analyze the optimal offer of D2 to
S for any given tariff T2(q2). D2 optimally offers a tariff Ts(q2) which maximizes
its expected net payments, ensuring that the anticipated equilibrium quantities
q2(c2) are indeed optimal for S and guaranteeing S a non-negative profit. For the
given tariff T2(q2), D2 thus offers a tariff Ts(q2) which is a solution to the following






s.t. q2(c2) ∈ argmax
q
R(q)− c2k(q)− Ts(q), (ICs)
max
q
R(q)− c2k(q)− Ts(q) ≥ 0 for all c2 ∈ [c,∞). (PCs)
Note that a quantity schedule q2(c2) can be optimal for S under some tariff Ts(q2)
if and only if q2(c2) is non-increasing. D2’s optimal response to the offered tariff
T2(q2) satisfies the following conditions.
Lemma 3.2. Given any tariff T2(q2) offered by U , D2 optimally offers a tariff
Ts(q2) to S such that S orders a quantity q2(c2) and D2 makes a non-negative
profit for any c2 ∈ [c,∞):
q2(c2) = argmax
q
R(q)− h(c2)k(q)− T2(q), (3.3)
max
q
R(q)− h(c2)k(q)− T2(q) ≥ 0. (3.4)
D2 offers a tariff which induces S to order a quantity that maximizes the virtual
joint profit of D2 and S. This is reflected in equation (3.3). Furthermore, D2 can
guarantee itself a non-negative profit. To see this, suppose D2’s profit is negative
for some realization of the cost parameter c′2. By the envelope theorem, D2’s
profit for cost parameter c2, given by maxq R(q) − h(c2)k(q) − T2(q) is decreasing
in c2. Thus D2’s profit is negative for all cost parameters higher than c
′
2. D2
can then offer a different tariff under which S orders zero quantity for all values
of the cost parameter above c′2, D2 rejects U ’s offer for these values of c2, and
ordered quantities remain the same as before for cost parameters below c′2. The
new quantity schedule remains non-increasing and therefore there exists a tariff
which makes these quantities optimal for S. Furthermore, this tariff increases D2’s
expected profit.
Thus, U optimally offers a tariff T2(q2) to D2 which anticipates the quantity
that S orders under an optimal response tariff Ts(q2), and which guarantees D2
a non-negative profit for any realization of the cost parameter c2. Formally, the
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s.t. q2(c2) ∈ argmax
q
R(q)− h(c2)k(q)− T2(q), (IC2)
max
q
R(q)− h(c2)k(q)− T2(q) ≥ 0 for all c2 ∈ [c,∞). (PC2)
The solution to this optimization problem completes the characterization of equi-
librium behavior if price discrimination is allowed.
Lemma 3.3. If price discrimination is permitted, U offers the tariff T d2 (c2) to
D2, D2 offers the tariff T
d





s (q2), and q
d
2(c2) are given by









R(q)− (h(c2) + h′(c2)(h(c2)− c2))k(q), (3.7)
where (qd2)
−1(·) is the inverse of q2(c2) with
(qd2)
−1(0) = c2 ≡ min {c ∈ [c,∞) : q2(c) = 0} .
In equilibrium, the quantities q2(c2) maximize a virtual joint profit of the indus-
try on market 2, where the expression in equation (3.7) reflects an informational
double marginalization problem. If U produces a quantity q2 for market 2, a mar-
gin of h(c2) − c2 has to be given to S, and a margin of h′(c2)(h(c2) − c2) has to
be granted to D2, in order to extract the information about the cost parameter
c2. This double marginalization problem implies that if the cost parameters c1 and
c2 take identical values, the quantity on market 1 is larger than the quantity on
market 2.
Price discrimination between D1 and D2 I am now in a position to compare
the tariffs T d1 (q1) and T
d
2 (q2). This allows me to answer the questions whether there
is price discrimination between the downstream firms and which form of vertical
organization is favored under price discrimination. Apart from the fact that D1
has a cost function of c1k(q) whereas D2 has a cost function of h(c2)k(q), U ’s
optimization problems Pd1 and Pd2 are equivalent. If D1 and D2 face the same tariff
T (q), D1 and D2 choose the same quantity whenever the cost parameters satisfy
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the condition c1 = h(c2). Whether U discriminates between the downstream firms
can now be simply tested by comparing the quantities which D1 and D2 buy for
c1 = h(c2).
Lemma 3.4. U price discriminates between D1 and D2 if and only if
q1(h(c)) ̸= q2(c) for some c ∈ [c,∞).
This test can now be applied.
Proposition 3.1. U discriminates between D1 and D2 by favoring D2 if and only if
h(·) is strictly convex for some values of the cost parameter which satisfy q1(c) > 0.
If h(·) is linear, U offers D1 and D2 the same tariff.
Proof. From equations (3.2) and (3.7), it follows that q1(h(c)) = q2(c) if and only
if h(h(c)) = h(c) + h′(c)(h(c) − c). This is satisfied for all c ∈ [c,∞) if and
only if h(·) is linear. In contrast, if h(·) is strictly convex for some c′, h(h(c)) >
h(c) + h′(c)(h(c) − c) holds for c close to c′, and q2(c) > q1(h(c)). As h(·) is
assumed to be convex, q2(c) ≥ q1(h(c)) for all c ∈ [c,∞) and from the definitions
of T d1 (q1) and T
d
2 (q2) in equations (3.1) and (3.5) it follows that D2 is favored by
price discrimination.
Price discrimination arises if the virtual cost parameter function h(·) is curved.
How does this result come about? The curvature of h(·) influences how the ver-
tically separated firm D2 changes the tariff for the subcontractor Ts(·) when U
changes the tariff T2(·). If h(·) is linear, an increase in the marginal price charged
by U to D2 changes the induced demand on market 2 in the same way it changes
the demand on market 1. If h(·) is convex, then D2 increases the tariffs to S more
strongly such that the induced demand on market 2 reduces more than the induced
demand on market 1 for the same price change.
To see the relationship with price elasticity, suppose that R(q)−c ·k(q) is linear
in q and q ∈ [0, 1]. Furthermore assume that U charges a linear tariff T (q) = p · q.
The induced (expected) demand on market 1 then satisfies D1(p) = F (
R(1)−p
k(1) ) and
the induced (expected) demand on market 2 satisfies D2(p) = F (h
−1(R(1)−pk(1) )). For





p · f (P )
k(1) · F (P )
=
p
k(1) (h (P )− P )
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k(1) · F (h−1 (P ))
=
p · (h−1)′ (P )
k(1) (P − (h−1)′ (P ))
.
It follows that
ε2(p) ≥ ε1(p) ⇔
p · (h−1)′ (P )
k(1) (P − (h−1)′ (P ))
≥ p
k(1) (h (P )− P )
⇔ h(P )− h(h
−1(P ))




The condition in the last line is satisfied with equality if h(·) is linear. It is satisfied
with a strict inequality if h(·) is strictly convex. In this case, the induced demand
on market 2 is more elastic than the demand from market 1.
The relationship between the curvature of the virtual cost parameter to price
elasticity is less clear if R(q) − c · k(q) is not linear. Nevertheless, the curvature
of the virtual cost parameter determines the favored downstream firm. This is
similar to price discrimination on separated consumer markets where relative price
elasticity determines the favored market.
Optimal tariff when price discrimination is banned
I now analyze the equilibrium behavior in the game when price discrimination is
banned. If price discrimination is banned, U has to offer the same tariff to the two
downstream firms. The optimal tariff needs to satisfy incentive and participation
constraints for both downstream firms. These constraints are the same as in the
case when price discrimination is allowed. In particular, Lemma 3.2 still describes
the optimal tariff which D2 offers to S in response to the offer from U . The only
additional constraint for U is the ban on discrimination.




T (q1(c1))dF (c1) +
∫
T (q2(c2))dF (c2)
s.t. q1(c1) ∈ argmax
q
R(q)− c1k(q)− T (q), (ICn1 )
q2(c2) ∈ argmax
q
R(q)− h(c2)k(q)− T (q), (ICn2 )
max
q
R(q)− c1k(q)− T (q) ≥ 0 for all c1 ∈ [c,∞), (PCn1 )
max
q
R(q)− h(c2)k(q)− T (q) ≥ 0 for all c2 ∈ [c,∞). (PCn2 )
The problem Pn is technically equivalent to the problems Pd1 and Pd2 with the addi-
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tional non-discrimination constraint that T1(q) = T2(q). This constraint connects
these two problems. The equilibrium behavior under a ban on price discrimination
is then given in the following lemma.
Lemma 3.5. If price discrimination is banned, U offers the tariff Tn(q) to D1
and D2, D2 offers the tariff T
n
s (q) to S, D1 and S accept the offers, D1 orders the
quantity qn1 (c1) = q
n(h−1(c1)), and S orders the quantity q
n
2 (c2) = q
n(c2). T
n(q),
Tns (q), and q


















where (qn)−1(·) is the inverse of qn(c) with
(qn)−1(0) = cn ≡ min {c ∈ [c,∞) : qn(c) = 0} .
3.4 Welfare effects under asymmetric agency costs
In this section, I analyze the welfare effects of price discrimination if downstream
firms differ with respect to their agency costs.
For this purpose, I first determine the effects of a ban on price discrimination
on consumers and downstream firms on the two markets. I show that the vertically
separated firm D2 and the consumers on market 2 are harmed by a ban on price
discrimination whereas the vertically integrated firm D1 and consumers on market
1 benefit.
I then compare the total welfare arising under the optimal uniform tariff with
the total welfare in the case where U sets the optimal discriminating tariffs. I show
that under mild conditions on cost and demand functions price discrimination
increases welfare. Intuitively, price discrimination is beneficial to welfare as it
partially offsets the inefficiency which arises through double marginalization on
market 2. Price discrimination shifts production from market 1 to market 2. As
total production is smaller on market 2, the marginal consumer on market 1 has a
lower valuation for the good than the marginal consumer on market 2. The shift
in production from market 1 to market 2 is therefore welfare increasing.
The social welfare on market i for a given cost parameter ci and a quantity qi






This is the sum of the consumer surplus, given by
∫ qi
0 P (x)dx−P (qi)qi, and the pro-
ducer surplus P (qi)qi − cik(qi). In a given equilibrium with equilibrium quantities





Equivalently, one can define the expected consumer surplus on the two markets.
The total expected welfare is the sum of expected welfare on the two markets, i.e.,
W (q1(·), q2(·)) = W1(q1(·)) +W2(q2(·)).
The effects of price discrimination on the two markets If price discrimina-
tion is allowed, U favors the separated downstream firm D1 over the integrated firm
D2. This is not allowed anymore once price discrimination is banned. U then has
to treat D1 and D2 the same. This implies that the quantity on market 1 increases
if price discrimination is banned whereas the quantity on market 2 decreases.
Proposition 3.2. Price discrimination decreases the quantity produced by the ver-
tically integrated downstream firm D1, increases the quantity produced by the verti-
cally separated downstream firm D2, and the vertically integrated downstream firm
produces a higher quantity with and without price discrimination:
qn2 (c) ≤ qd2(c) < qd1(c) ≤ qn1 (c).
As a consequence of the effect on market quantities, a ban on price discrimi-
nation increases the expected profit of D1 and the expected consumer surplus on
market 1. It decreases the expected profits of D2 and S and decreases the expected
consumer surplus on market 2.
If price discrimination is banned, D2 faces a tariff which is everywhere steeper
than the tariff under price discrimination. Thus, D2 increases the tariff in the
subcontract and the quantity ordered by S decreases for any realization of the cost
parameter. It follows that not only D2 and S are worse off, but also the consumers
on market 2 who face a higher price. The converse holds true on market 1. After
a ban on price discrimination, D1 faces a flatter tariff than before. D1 orders a
higher quantity of the input and the price on market 1 decreases to the benefit of
consumers.
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Effects on total welfare A ban on price discrimination increases welfare on
market 1 but decreases welfare on market 2. Thus, price discrimination increases
total welfare, if the welfare gain on market 2 outweighs the welfare loss on market
1. If price discrimination is banned, production for market 2 is shifted to market
1. Whether price discrimination is permitted or not, the quantity on market 1 is
higher than the quantity on market 2 even if the cost parameters are the same
for D1 and S. This implies that the price on market 1 is lower than the price on
market 2. Thus, the marginal consumers on market 1 have a lower marginal value
for the good than the marginal consumers on market 2. This suggests that price
discrimination should increase total welfare since it shifts the good from low to high
valuation consumers. However, the total quantity of production may be different
with and without price discrimination. If total quantity remains constant in both
situations, or is higher under price discrimination, then price discrimination should
be allowed.













The inverse demand functions net of marginal costs are depicted for both markets and identical
cost parameters c1 = c2 = c. The quantity q
d
i is sold on market i if price discrimination is allowed,
qni is sold if price discrimination is banned. A ban on price discrimination increases the quantity
on market 1 and reduces the quantity on market 2. The dark shaded area is the resulting welfare
gain on market 1, the light shaded area represents the welfare loss on market 2.
Figure 3.2 illustrates this argument: In the figure, the inverse demand function
net of marginal costs is depicted for both markets and identical cost parameters




2 are the quantities if price discrimination is
allowed. Due to the double marginalization problem on market 2, qd1 > q
d
2 even
though the cost parameters are identical. This implies that the marginal consumer
on market 1 has a lower marginal value for the good than the marginal consumer
on market 2. If price discrimination is banned, the quantity on market 1 increases
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to qn1 and the dark shaded area represents the welfare gain on market 1. However,
the quantity on market 2 decreases to qn2 and the light shaded area represents the
reduction in welfare on market 2. If the total quantity on both markets is similar
with and without price discrimination, i.e. qn1 − qd1 ≃ qd2 − qn2 , then the light shaded
area is clearly larger than the dark shaded area and a ban on price discrimination
reduces welfare.
If marginal revenue per marginal costs is concave, then total quantity on both
markets for identical cost parameters c1 and c2 is higher under price discrimination.
This implies that total welfare is higher under price discrimination. As the welfare
w(ci, qi) is concave in quantity, total welfare tends to increase if the quantities on
both markets become more similar. This implies that price discrimination remains
welfare increasing, even if it slightly reduces total quantity on the two markets.
Proposition 3.3. If R′(q)/k′(q) is concave, then price discrimination increases
welfare when downstream firms have different agency costs.
Proposition 3.3 implies that for a linear cost function k(q) = K · q with K > 0,
price discrimination increases welfare if marginal revenue is concave. One example
of a demand function for which marginal revenue is concave is the linear inverse
demand function P (q) = max{A−B · q, 0} for A,B > 0.
3.5 Agency versus production costs
In this section, I want to relate the welfare results of the previous section to the
welfare implications of price discrimination in a setting where all downstream firms
produce the final good themselves but differ with respect to production costs. In
this case, the cost differences between downstream firms are not caused by different
forms of vertical organization but are due to the fact that downstream firms use
different production technologies.
Thus, I compare the welfare effects of price discrimination in a model with
asymmetric agency cost to the welfare effects in a model with asymmetric produc-
tion costs. In particular, I analyze the welfare effects of price discrimination under
asymmetric production costs in a setting in which the upstream firm U optimally
offers the same tariffs as in the model with asymmetric agency costs studied in the
previous sections. This allows a clean comparison of the welfare effects of price
discrimination in the two models. Furthermore this approach points to a practical
problem in the regulation of price discrimination: The source of cost differences
cannot be identified from the tariffs and quantities observed on the market. This
poses the question whether a competition authority can make the right regulatory
decision without knowledge of the source of cost differences.
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Figure 3.3: Industry structure with asymmetric production costs
U
D1 D2
Market 1 Market 2
The upstream firm U sells to two downstream firms that are vertically integrated and serve inde-
pendent markets.
First, I show that price discrimination has always a more positive effect on
welfare in the model with asymmetric agency costs. I then show that under mild
conditions on demand and cost functions, price discrimination is welfare increasing
under asymmetric agency costs and welfare decreasing under asymmetric produc-
tion costs. A competition authority can therefore not choose the right regulatory
regime without knowledge of the source of cost differences between the downstream
firms.
Herweg and Müller (2014) introduce the model of asymmetric production costs
studied in this section. For specific assumptions on the distribution function, their
model with asymmetric production costs is equivalent to the model with asymmet-
ric agency costs studied in the previous section. In order to prove the result that
price discrimination has different welfare effects in the two models, I extend Propo-
sition 7 in Herweg and Müller (2014) to more general demand and cost functions.
A model with asymmetric production costs
The industry structure of the model with asymmetric production costs is given in
Figure 3.3. In contrast to the model with asymmetric agency costs, D2 produces
the final good itself using a one-to-one technology. D2’s cost function is given
by c2 · k(q2). Whereas the cost parameter of D1 is distributed according to the
cumulative distribution function F (·), the cost parameter c2 is now distributed
according to the distribution function G(c2) = F (h
−1(c2)).
For the upstream firm U , this situation is perfectly equivalent to the model
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whereD2 delegates production to the subcontractor S, has a virtual cost function of
h(c2), and c2 is distributed according to F (·). Furthermore, the downstream firms
order the same quantities in both models. The model with asymmetric production
costs and the model with asymmetric agency costs therefore give rise to the same
tariffs and quantities.
Proposition 3.4. In the equilibrium of the model with asymmetric production
costs, U sets the tariffs TD1 (q1) and T
D
2 (q2) if price discrimination is permitted, and
TN (qi) with i ∈ {1, 2} if price discrimination is banned. These tariffs are the same




2 (q) = T
d
2 (q),
and TN (q) = Tn(q) for all q ≥ 0.
The downstream firms order the quantities qD1 (c1) and q
D
2 (c2) if price discrim-
ination is permitted, and qN (ci) with i ∈ {1, 2} if price discrimination is banned.
For D1 these quantities are the same as in the model with asymmetric agency
costs: qD1 (c1) = q
d
1(c1) and q
N (c1) = q
n
1 (c1) for all c1 ∈ [c,∞). For D2 the quan-
tity ordered for cost parameter c2 is the same as the quantity in the model with
asymmetric agency cost for the cost parameter h−1(c2): q
D




qN (c2) = q
n
2 (h
−1(c2)) for all c2 ∈ [c,∞).
For the same cost parameter c = c1 = c2, a ban on price discrimination in-
creases the quantity produced by D1 and decreases the quantity produced by D2:
qN (c) ∈ [qD1 (c), qD2 (c)] for all c ∈ [c,∞).
This result follows from the observation that it does not matter for the in-
centives of D2 whether the cost parameter c2 is real – as in the model with
asymmetric production costs – or virtual – as in the case of asymmetric agency
costs. Furthermore the result arises as the real cost parameter in the model with
asymmetric production costs and the virtual cost parameter in the model with
asymmetric agency costs are identically distributed, due to the definition of G(c2)
given by Pr(h(c2) ≤ c) = Pr(c2 ≤ h−1(c)) = G(c). For the same cost parameters
c1 = c2 = c, the quantity produced under a ban on price discrimination is bracketed
by the quantities produced under price discrimination, i.e. qN (c) ∈ [qD1 (c), qD2 (c)].
A ban on price discrimination therefore reduces the difference in the quantities on
the two markets for the same real cost parameter. I now turn to the comparison
of the welfare effects of price discrimination in the two models.
A comparison of the welfare effects of price discrimination
In this section, I compare the welfare effects of price discrimination in the models
with different agency costs and different production costs. I first show that price
discrimination has always more favorable welfare effects in the model with asym-
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metric agency costs. The welfare effect of price discrimination under asymmetric












w(qD2 (c), c)− w(qN (c), c)
]
dG(c).













w(qd2(c), c)− w(qn2 (c), c)
+ (c− h−1(c))(k(qd2(c))− k(qn2 (c)))
]
dF (c).
This expression can be rewritten using the equilibrium quantities of the model with












w(qD2 (c), c)− w(qN (c), c)
+ (c− h−1(c))(k(qD2 (c))− k(qN (c)))
]
dG(c).





(c− h−1(c))(k(qD2 (c))− k(qN (c)))
]
dG(c). (3.11)
This expression reflects the fundamental difference of production costs and agency
costs with respect to welfare. If the downstream firms differ with respect to produc-
tion costs, their cost functions are directly represented in the expression of total
welfare. However, if the downstream firms have asymmetric agency costs, then
their cost differences include rent payments to subcontractors. These rent pay-
ments are a private cost to the delegating downstream firm but not a social cost
since they are the profit of the subcontractor.
In particular, this implies that if the downstream firmD2 has production costs of
c ·k(q), then the social costs of production are c ·k(q) in the model with asymmetric
production costs. In the model with asymmetric agency costs, the social costs are
h−1(c) ·k(q). The difference of these terms, (c−h−1(c))k(q), are the rent payments
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to the subcontractor.
The difference in the welfare effects of a ban on price discrimination under
different agency cost and different production cost is positive, since downstream
firm D2 is favored under price discrimination.
Proposition 3.5. The welfare gain from price discrimination is higher in the
model with asymmetric agency costs: ∆WA > ∆WP .
Price discrimination has very different effects in the two models. In the model
with asymmetric agency costs, a ban on price discrimination increases the difference
in quantities produced by the downstream firms for the same real cost parameters.
In contrast, in the model with asymmetric production costs, a ban on price dis-
crimination decreases the difference in quantities for the same real cost parameter.
If the quantities on the markets become more similar, then production is shifted
from the market with high quantity and low price to the market with low quan-
tity and high price. In other words, the good is redistributed from the marginal
consumer on the first market to the marginal consumer on the second market. As
the price is lower on the first market, the marginal consumer on this market has
a lower valuation than the marginal consumer on the second market. Due to this
redistribution effect, total welfare tends to be higher if the quantities on the two
markets are more similar for the same real cost parameters.
If marginal revenue per marginal costs is concave and both markets are covered,
the total quantity for the same cost parameter is higher if price discrimination
is banned. Together with the marginal effect described above, this implies the
following result.
Proposition 3.6. Suppose R′(q)/k′(q) is concave. Price discrimination decreases
welfare in the model with asymmetric production costs if the exclusion of market 1
is unlikely, i.e., if Pr(qD1 (c1) = 0) ≤ Q for some Q ∈ (0, 1).
For very high cost parameters, market 2 is still served under price discrimination
whereas it is not served if price discrimination is banned. If this case is sufficiently
unlikely, price discrimination reduces welfare if marginal revenue per marginal costs
is concave.
The conditions of Proposition 3.6 are satisfied for the linear inverse demand
function P (q) = max{A − B · q, 0} and the linear cost function K · q if K is
sufficiently small.
For a wide range of demand and cost functions, price discrimination is beneficial
for welfare in the model with asymmetric agency costs and detrimental for welfare
in the model with asymmetric production costs. Thus, the source of cost differences
crucially influences the welfare implications of price discrimination.
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3.6 Conclusion
This chapter provides an analysis of the welfare effects of price discrimination in
intermediate good markets when downstream firms have different costs. I first
analyze a model where the cost differences are implied by different agency costs
due to asymmetric vertical integration. I show that price discrimination increases
social welfare for a wide range of demand and cost functions. I then compare this
result with the welfare effects of price discrimination in a model where cost differ-
ences are the consequence of different production costs. I demonstrate that price
discrimination has more positive effects on welfare in the model with asymmetric
agency costs. Furthermore, I show that price discrimination reduces welfare in
the model with asymmetric production costs for the same condition on demand
and cost functions as long as both markets are unlikely to be excluded. The wel-
fare effects of price discrimination therefore crucially depend on the source of cost
differences between firms.
The analysis in this chapter was restricted to the case where downstream firms
serve separate markets. The results can be expected to extend to the case where
downstream firms compete in the same market but offer very differentiated prod-
ucts. It remains an open and very interesting question to which extent the results
from the current chapter extend to the case where downstream competition is in-
tense. This question is left for future research.
CHAPTER 3. PRICE DISCRIMINATION WITH AGENCY COSTS 105
3.7 Appendix to Chapter 3
Example for a distribution function which satisfies Assumption 3.2
Lemma 3.6. The distribution function F (c) = e−1/a(c−b) satisfies Assumption 3.2.
Proof. As f(c) = e−1/a(c−b) · 1
a(c−b)2 , the virtual cost parameter is h(c) = c+a(c−b)
2
which is increasing and convex. Point 2. of the Assumption is satisfied if g(c)f(c) =
f(h−1(c))/h′(h−1(c))
f(c) is weakly increasing. As h(c) is increasing, this is the case if
f(c)





− 1a(c−b) · 1
a(c−b)2
e
− 1a(c−b)(1+a(c−b)) · 1+2a(c−b)
a(c−b)2(1+a(c−b))2
= e
− 11+a(c−b) · (1+a(c−b))
2
1+2a(c−b) .
This term is increasing. It remains to check that 3. of Assumption 3.2 is satis-
fied. Note that c + F (c)+G(c)f(c)+g(c) = c +
F (c)+F (h−1(c))
f(c)+f(h−1(c))/h′(h−1(c)) is increasing if h(c) +
F (h(c))+F (c)
f(h(c))+f(c)h′(c) = h(c) + h
′(c) F (h(c))+F (c)f(h(c))h′(c)+f(c) is increasing. After some tedious cal-
culations, it can be shown that
h(c) + h′(c)
F (h(c)) + F (c)
f(h(c))h′(c) + f(c)







= c+ a(c− b)2 + (1 + 2a(c− b))a(c− b)2 1 + e
−1/a(c−b)
1 + e−1/a(c−b) 1+2a(c−b)
(1+a(c−b))2





is increasing. This is the case
as 1+2a(c−b)
(1+a(c−b))2 is increasing.
Proof of Lemma 3.1
Define the variable Π1(c1) = maxq R(q) − c1k(q) − T1(q). By standard arguments
the incentive compatibility constraint IC1 is equivalent to Π
′
1(c1) = −k(q1(c1))
and q1(c1) being non-increasing. Using integration by parts, the problem Pd1 can






[R(q1(c1))− h(c1)k(q1(c1))] dF (c1)−Π1(c1)
subject to Π1(c1) ≥ 0 and q1(c1) non-decreasing in c1. The solution to this problem
is given by Π1(c1) = 0, q
d
1(c1) which is the pointwise maximizer of the expression
above and is non-increasing in c1, and c1 = min{c ∈ [c,∞) : argmaxq R(q) −
h(c)k(q) = 0}. T d1 (·) can be computed using the condition R′(qd1(c))−c1k′(qd1(c)) =
(T d)′(qd1(c)) which implies R
′(q)− (qd1)−1(q)k′(q) = (T d)′(q) where (qd1)−1(x) is the
inverse function of qd1(c), precisely defined in the Lemma. Using this and T
d(0) = 0
gives the result.
Proof of Lemma 3.2
Define Πs(c2) ≡ maxq R(q)− c2k(q)− Ts(q). By essentially the same arguments as





[R(q2(c2))− h(c2)k(q2(c2))− T2(q2(c2))] dF (c2)−Πs(c2)
subject to Πs(c2) ≥ 0 and q2(c2) non-decreasing in c2. The quantity q2(c2) which
maximizes the expression above pointwisely in non-decreasing in c2. Thus, it is part
of any solution. I now show that D2 can guarantee himself a positive payoff Note
first that maxq R(q)− h(c2)k(q)− T2(q) is non-increasing in c2. If in any BPE D2
incurs a negative profit for some c2, it also incurs a negative profit for all c
′
2 > c2.
Define ĉ2 = inf{c ∈ [c,∞) : maxq R(q) − h(c2)k(q) − T2(q) < 0}. For any c2 ≥ ĉ2,
D2 could commit vis-à-vis S not to accept U ’s offer. As the quantity is then zero
for c2 ≥ ĉ2, and positive and non-decreasing for c2 < ĉ2, the new quantity schedule
is still implementable but can be implemented at a higher profit. D2 therefore has
a profitable deviation.
Proof of Lemma 3.3
The proof follows the same steps the proof of Lemma 3.1 with the only differences
that c1 is replaced by h(c2). T
d
s (q) can be computed as T
d
1 (q) above, T
d
2 (q) can be
computed as T d1 (q) above where c1 is replaced by h(c2).
Proof of Lemma 3.5
Note at first that the results of Lemma 3.2 still hold if price discrimination is
banned, thus Pn is the correct optimization problem. Define Π1(c1) = maxq R(q)−
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c1k(q)−T (q) and Π2(c2) = maxq R(q)−h(c2)k(q)−T (q). By standard arguments,
(ICn1 ) is equivalent to Π
′
1(c1) = −k(q1(c1)) and q1(c1) non-increasing and (ICn2 ) is
equivalent to Π′2(c2) = −h′(c2)k(q2(c2)) and q2(c2) non-increasing. One can now
make a change of variable from T (·) to Π1(c1) and Π2(c2) where Π1(c1) = Π2(c2)
if c1 = h(c2). This is equivalent to q1(c1) = q2(c2) if c1 = h(c2). Using integration














subject to qi(ci) non-increasing for i ∈ {1, 2}, Π1(c) ≥ 0, and q1(h(c)) = q2(c) for all
c ∈ [c,∞). It is optimal to set Π1(c) = 0. Neglecting the monotonicity constraints,

















Maximizing the Lagrangian in a pointwise way gives the quantities qn1 (c1) and
qn2 (c2) stated in the Lemma. Under Assumption 3.2, these quantities are non-
increasing and therefore satisfy the neglected monotonicity constraints. The tariffs
Tn(q) and Tns (q) can be computed as in the proofs of Lemmata 3.2 and 3.3.
Proof of Proposition 3.2
I show at first that qn1 (c) = q
n(h(c)) ≥ qd1(c1). This holds as
c+
F (c) + h′(h−1(c))F (h−1(c))
f(c) + f(h−1(c))
≤ c+ F (c)
f(c)
⇔ h′(h−1(c))(c− h−1(c)) ≤ h(c)− c
which is satisfied due to the convexity of h(·).
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Next, I show that qn2 (c) = q
n(c) ≤ qd2(c2). This holds as
h(c) +
F (h(c)) + h′(c)F (c)
f(h(c)) + f(c)
≥ h(c) + h′(c)(h(c)− c)
⇔ h(h(c))− h(c) ≥ (h(c)− c)h′(c)
which is also satisfied because h(·) is convex.
Finally, qd1(c) > q
d
2(c) follows from
h(c) < h(c) + h′(c)(h(c)− c).
Proof of Proposition 3.3





w(c, qd1(c)) + w(c, q
d
2(c))− w(c, qn1 (c))− w(c, qn2 (c))
)
dF (c).
Due to the concavity of the welfare function, total welfare is higher under price
discrimination if (i) |qd1(c)− qd2(c)| ≤ |qn1 (c)− qn2 (c)| and (ii) qd1(c)+ qd2(c) ≥ qn1 (c)+
qn2 (c) for all cost parameters c. (i) is satisfied because h(·) is convex. This is shown
in the proof of Proposition 3.2. To show that (ii) holds, define φ(x) as the inverse
function of R′(q)/k′(q), i.e. R′(φ(x))/k′(φ(x)) = x. For all c such that all quantities
are positive, (ii) can be written as
φ(h(c)) + φ
(
















If R′(q)/k′(q) is decreasing and concave, φ(x) is decreasing and concave and (ii)
holds if
h(c) + h(c) + h′(c)(h(c)− c) ≤
c+
F (c) + h′(h−1(c))F (h−1(c))
f(c) + f(h−1(c))
+ h(c) +
F (h(c)) + h′(c)F (c)
f(h(c)) + f(c)
.
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This is equivalent to
F (c)
f(c)
− F (c) + h
′(h−1(c))F (h−1(c))
f(c) + f(h−1(c))





which can equivalently be expressed as
F (c)f(h−1(c))− f(c)F (h−1(c))h′(h−1(c))
f(c) + f(h−1(c))




The last inequality is satisfied if
F (c)f(h−1(c))− f(c)F (h−1(c))h′(h−1(c))
f(h−1(c)) + f(c))




























(F (c) +G(c))(f(c)g′(c)− f ′(c)g(c))
(f(c) + g(c))2
which is positive under Assumption 3.2. Until here, I made the assumption that
both markets are always covered. However, note that market 2 is more likely to be
not served if price discrimination is banned. In that case, the calculations made
above are a lower bound on the welfare gain from price discrimination, and this
lower bound was shown to be positive. Because welfare is strictly concave in q, a
continuity argument implies that the result holds as long as R′(q)/k′(q) – and thus
φ(x) – is not too convex.
Proof of Proposition 3.4
The results of the first two paragraphs follow from the observation that the down-
stream firm D2 in the model with asymmetric production costs behaves for the
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cost parameter c2 as the vertically separated downstream firm in the model with
asymmetric agency costs for the cost parameter h−1(c2).
It remains to show that qN (c) ∈ [qD1 (c), qD2 (c)]. qN (c) ≥ qD1 (c) follows from




1 (c) = q
d
1(c), and Proposition 3.2. q
N (c) ≤ qD2 (c) follows from




2 (c) = q
d
2(h
−1(c)), and the ranking of virtual cost parameters for













Proof of Proposition 3.5

































































2 (z2))− w(z2, qN (z2)
+ (z2 − h−1(z2))(k(qD2 (z2))− k(qN (z2)))
]
dG(z2),
where the second equality follows from a change of variable from c2 to z2 = h(c2)
and where F (c1) = F (c1) and G(c2) = F (h
−1(c2)). For z2 = c2, this expression
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is equal to the expression in the main text. It is now immediate to observe that





Proof of Proposition 3.6
I show that ∆WP < 0 if R
′(q)/k′(q) is concave and Pr(qd2(c2) = 0) ≤ Q for
some Q ∈ [0, 1]. Suppose at first that R′(q)/k′(q) is concave and define as above
the concave function φ(x) by R′(φ(x))/k′(φ(x)) = x. The welfare effect of price




f(c)w(c, qd1(c)) + g(c)w(c, q
d
2(c))− (f(c) + g(c))w(c, qn(c))
)
dc.
For a given c and due to the strict concavity of the function w(c, q) in q, the
expression below the integral is strictly positive if f(c)qd1(c) + g(c)q
d
2(c) ≤ (f(c) +




















for any c ∈ [c,∞) such that qD1 (c) > 0. Note that Equation (3.12) is satisfied as
φ(x) is concave. If the probability Pr(qD1 (c1) = 0) that the market 2 is excluded
is sufficiently small, the total welfare effect of price discrimination is negative, i.e.,
∆WP < 0.
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